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Legislating in the Light: Considering
Empirical Data in Crafting
Arbitration Reforms
Amy J. Schmitz*
ABSTRACT

Consumer advocates and policymakers call for abolition of predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, while proponents of arbitration claim such abolition would increase companies' dispute resolution costs, leading to higher prices and
interest rates. Policymakers on both sides of the debate, however, rarely consider the empirical research necessary for crafting informed arbitration disclosure rules. This article therefore
focuses on how varied research, including my own empirical
studies, may inform policies regarding arbitration disclosure
regulations. The article also offers suggestions for regulations
tailored to have the most impact for the cost in light of this
research.
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INTRODUCTION

Companies increasingly include arbitration clauses among the
"modular" terms cobbled into boilerplate contracts.' Consumers already skeptical of the market assume such boilerplate is nonnegotiable and skewed toward the companies' interests. 2 Commentators
and policymakers worry that pre-dispute arbitration clauses rob consumers of their judicial recourse rights without knowing consent and
unfairly advantage corporate "repeat players" who routinely include
arbitration clauses in their form consumer contracts. 3 These critics
add that companies use these clauses to curb consumer remedies, bar
class actions, and shield the public from information regarding
safety, disclosure, and other statutory violations. 4 Some also argue
5
that this essentially allows companies to create private law.
1. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1235, 1240 (2006) (highlighting how "'boilerplate' has itself taken on a cultural meaning" that translates into a signal that such form terms are not negotiable, especially
with respect to arbitration clauses).
2. Id. at 1241 (discussing sociological impacts of form contracts).
3. See Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 129-40 (2006) (highlighting American law's
enforcement of mandatory consumer arbitration under pre-dispute form contracts).
4. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1211, 1212-13 (2007) (discussing privacy in arbitration).
5. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration,83 MINN.L. REV. 704, 704-712, 754 (1999) (discussing how "arbitration privatizes the creation of law"); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania?
ProtectingProcedurallyFairArbitration in a Consumer Microcosm, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON
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Nonetheless, courts in the United States usually enforce these
clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 6 and efficiency-focused contract law. 7 Proponents of this regime highlight how arbitration clauses can be "fair" and foster satisfying proceedings for
companies and individuals. In addition, some arbitration-administering institutions have taken steps toward protecting procedural
fairness for consumers and employees who often lack the resources of
their corporate opponents. Some therefore claim that arbitration
critics overreact to tales of unfairness in seeking to enact broad legislative bans on arbitration clauses.
Still, strong arguments remain for regulating consumer arbitration. I have been among those who have critiqued harsh consumer
arbitration provisions, and I have proposed that the existing dispute
resolution template of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act ("MMWA") 8 should incorporate consumer arbitration reforms to protect consumers' access to warranty
remedies and clarify how MMWA claims may be arbitrated fairly.9 I
also have urged policymakers to transform the "shoulds" of the 1998
Consumer Due Process Protocol, proposed bythe American Arbitration Association and others through the National Consumer Disputes
Advisory Committee, into legislative "musts" that would survive FAA
preemption. 10 The Protocol suggests procedural fairness "shoulds"
including: clear notice of arbitration clauses and how to obtain information regarding the arbitration process, preservation of consumers'
Disp. RESOL. 291, 313-15, 371 (2005) (discussing how manufacturers' use of form arbitration agreements has privatized dispute resolution in the mobile home industry).
6. Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006) (covering domestic
arbitration), §§ 201-208 (implementing the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention")), §§ 301-307 (implementing the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
("Panama Convention")). See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91
(2001) (emphasizing the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements").
7. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability,and Equilibrium:The Return of UnconscionabilityAnalysis as a Counterweightto Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 812-13 (2004) (highlighting restrained application of
unconscionability in the wake of rising formalism).
8. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2006)).
9. Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumers' Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 Omo ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 627, 627-32, 661-86 (2008) [hereinafter
Schmitz, Warranty Woes] (discussing need for procedural protections in consumer arbitration proceedings); Amy J. Schmitz, Dangersof Deference to FormArbitrationProvisions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37, 37-55 (2007) [hereinafter Schmitz, Deference] (advancing
procedural regulation of arbitration in lieu of precluding arbitration).
10. National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process
Protocol, http://www.adr.orgtsp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
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access to small claims court, and measures ensuring "reasonable cost
to consumers" and "reasonably convenient" hearing locations."
The potential value of precluding or regulating arbitration
clauses is nonetheless unclear. This is largely due to the lack of empirical data regarding consumer arbitration clauses and consumers'
related contracting behavior. 12 Furthermore, policymakers propose
policies in the dark by failing to consider existing empirical data that
is critical to crafting effective and efficient arbitration reforms.13
Even the limited research available suggests that a broad ban on predispute arbitration agreements is unwarranted. There is evidence
that many companies do not use or abuse arbitration clauses in their
consumer contracts and that consumers often prevail in arbitration
proceedings.' 4 Nonetheless, narrower regulation may be warranted
to address some companies' use of onerous arbitration clauses to limit
remedies and preclude class proceedings to consumers'
5
disadvantage.'
11. Id.
12. See Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, Myth and Reality in Consumer Contracting Behavior (Aug. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at
SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1443908) (highlighting
lack of empirical data and policymakers' consideration of that data in designing contract reforms, relying instead on theoretical assumptions). This is subject to the tandem need for more research regarding the cognitive processes that underlie
individuals' "fairness" judgments. Maureen L. Ambrose & Carol T. Kulik, How Do I
Know That's Fair? A CategorizationApproach to FairnessJudgments, in RESEARCH
IN SOCIAL ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT: THEORETICAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 35, 37-43 (S.W. Gilliland et al. eds., 2001). But see Christopher

R. Drahozal, ContractingOut of the Uniform Commercial Code: Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loy.L.A. L. REV. 187, 200-201 (2006) (correctly noting that survey responses
regarding why people behave as they do "must be taken with a grain of salt").
13. See Joseph P. Mulholland, Behavioral Economics and the Federal Trade
Commission 12-15 (Dec. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at SSRN:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1091745) (discussing the FTC's
failure to fully consider empirical research in crafting policies and evaluating the effectiveness of consumer remedies).
14. See infra Part III.C (discussing studies indicating fair use of arbitration and
benefits of arbitration for consumers).
15. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration'sSummer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 871, 879-93 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 118-23 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration] (discussing the same study, noting conflicting research, and finding in this study of 21
large companies' contracts that companies' targeted use of arbitration clauses in only
their consumer contracts indicated motivation to avoid aggregate proceedings and
perhaps all liability).
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A more measured approach may be to regulate the content of
clauses and procedures applicable to consumer arbitration. 16 Although there are a variety of options for such regulation, this article
will focus on one initial step: requiring special notice and disclosure
provisions for pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.1 7 I have been among those calling for heightened disclosure
regulations, which garner support from voluntary consent notions
underlying promise enforcement theory.' 8 Emphasis on disclosure is
reflected in the 2008 Farm Bill, which permits a producer or grower
to opt out of arbitration before entering a contract and requires "conspicuous disclosure" of this opt-out right. 19 Some courts also have
interpreted fiduciary duties to require heightened disclosure and explanation of arbitration terms even where those terms appear in the
20
same contract that created the fiduciary relationship.
Although arbitration notice or disclosure regulations are not
overly intrusive, they should not be adopted without due regard for
how they may increase company costs. In addition, it would be imprudent to interfere with contractual freedom for no reason, and arbitration disclosures would not be worth their costs if consumers ignore
them regardless of how conspicuously companies state them in their
contracts. At the same time, disclosure regulations may have more
meaning and impact if they go beyond conspicuous notice to include
affirmative duties to educate consumers regarding the arbitration
process and its potential impacts on their rights. That said, it is unclear that consumers will take the time to read, listen to, or care
16.

See Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 661-86 (discussing a variety of

procedural regulations).
17. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts 4-5
(N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 91, 2007), available at http://lsr.
nellco.orglnyu-jewp/91/ (noting that many support disclosure regulations of some
type, but differ with respect to extent and content of those regulations).
18. See Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 661-64 (describing my and
other proposals for such disclosures).
19. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ("Farm Bill"), Pub. L. 110-246,
§ 210, 122 Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 197c (West 2010)). The
Farm Bill added a new section on the use of arbitration agreements to Title II of the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (2006) (also providing the grower a
right to opt into arbitration after a dispute arises if both parties agree in writing).
20. See Daly v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., No. 04-490, 2005 WL 590076, at
*1 (Mont. Mar. 15, 2005) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a pre-dispute arbitration clause in a client/broker account agreement was unenforceable even if the client would have separately signed the arbitration clause because this same account
agreement gave rise to the broker's fiduciary duty to fully explain the arbitration
clause in that agreement).
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about information pertaining to resolution of future claims they do
not foresee at the time of the transaction.
Design and implementation of arbitration disclosure regulations
therefore depend on deep and nuanced empirical research, not simply
doctrinal or theoretical assumptions. 2 1 This article therefore highlights this need by discussing the existing empirical data, including
my own, and suggests how this data may be used to tailor regulations
that will have the most impact for the costs. It also calls for further
research to test these ideas and generate more enlightened arbitration reforms.
Part II sets the stage with discussion of the law, theory, and policy guiding current enforcement and critiques of arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts. Part III describes the empirical research that
has focused on either comparing contract terms or arbitration outcomes and satisfaction. However, this research has not explored consumer contracting with respect to arbitration clauses. Part IV
therefore discusses my research exploring this area. This includes
my findings from consumer focus groups, a collection of arbitration
clauses in wireless phone service and credit card contracts, and responses to a survey administered over the Internet that relate to
whether consumers read, understand, or even care about arbitration
clauses. Part V offers suggestions for arbitration disclosure regulations in light of this and others' research. The article concludes with
a call for more deep and varied research aimed to guide arbitration
policy design.
II.

SYNOPSIS

OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION LAw, THEORY, AND POLICY

A. Arbitration Law
International and domestic arbitration laws generally require
enforcement of valid agreements to arbitrate and their incorporation
of rules such as those promulgated by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), or
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 2 2 This relegates enforcement analysis to contract formation and validity issues,
which courts have mainly approached in a formalistic and efficiency21. This article does not rehash well-covered policy arguments regarding the enforcement of consumer arbitration generally, or all possible regulations of arbitration
contracts and procedures. Instead, it focuses on consumer arbitration notice reforms
and the need for empirical research to craft informed policy.
22. Richard E. Speidel, Common Legal Issues in American Arbitration Law, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITicAL ASSESSMENT 29, 31-34 (2006).
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focused manner. 23 Proponents of arbitration argue that enforcement
results in cost and time savings, while critics complain that it impairs
law
consumer remedies and essentially allows companies to privatize
24
and avoid regulation through their arbitration programs.
1.

Broad Arbitration Statutes

On the international level, the widely-adopted New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards generally mandates summary enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards. 2 5 The United States has implemented this
Convention through Chapter Two of the FAA, 26 which U.S. courts
have applied with a pro-enforcement glaze aimed to promote both arbitration and international comity. 27 This glaze has also led courts to

narrowly read the Convention's allowance for public policy review of
arbitration awards to protect the discretion of arbitrators, and to curtail judicial power to mandate particular arbitration procedures or
contract formation standards.
Courts have similarly enforced domestic arbitration agreements
under the FAA Chapter One 28 and its state counterpart, the Uniform
23. See Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 635-36 (discussing preemption
and its impact on arbitration challenges).
24. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996)
(critiquing companies' inclusion of arbitration clauses in consumer and employment
contracts); Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the
Hard Questions, 33 Hous. L. REV. 327 (1996) (discussing the mandatory nature of
arbitration under NASD or NYSE rules in broker-dealer securities contracts).
25. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 67 (3d ed. 1999); THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, Articles 1-16 (1958), re-

printed in id. at 491-94 (including Appendix) [hereinafter NY CONVENTION]; United
Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), Status: 1958 - Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.
(last visited
org/uncitral/enluncitraltexts/arbitrationNYConventionstatus.html
Feb. 26, 2010) (noting 144 countries had adopted the Convention).

26.

FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006) (implementing the New York Convention),

§§ 301-307 (implementing the Panama Convention).
27. Kenneth F. Dunham, InternationalArbitration is Not Your Father'sOldsmobile Convention, 2 J. DisP. RESOL. 323, 326-27 (2005) (discussing the development of
international commercial arbitration and noting the importance of the New York Convention in that development); id. at 330-31 (discussing importance of contract terms
and rules incorporated therein in dictating the arbitration procedures); NY CONVENTION, supra note 25, at Arts. 1-16.
28. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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Arbitration Act ("UAA"). 29 These laws require courts to specifically
enforce domestic arbitration agreements, and they augment this
mandate with provisions for liberal venue, immediate appeal from orders adverse to arbitration, appointment of arbitrators if parties can-

not do so by agreement, limited review of arbitration awards, and
treatment of awards as final judgments. 30

Furthermore, the Su-

preme Court's holding that the FAA preempts states from singling
out arbitration for special treatment or otherwise hindering the enforcement of arbitration in contracts affecting interstate commerce
leaves states with little power to regulate consumer arbitration provi-

sions beyond application of general contract defenses. 3 1
Drafters of form consumer contracts therefore have great power
in dictating arbitration provisions and procedures. 3 2 They may pro-

vide for ad hoc arbitration they administer themselves, or they may
incorporate some or all of the procedural rules promulgated by ad-

ministering institutions such as the AAA, ICC, or NASD. 33 The institutions' rules generally cover hearing location, arbitrator
appointment, discovery, fees and costs, and other such basics, and
they may provide for special procedures in consumer cases. 34 For example, the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules require parties to

29. Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), 7 U.L.A. § 1 (1997). The UAA is model legislation that nearly all states have adopted to require the same basic enforcement for
local arbitration agreements and awards beyond the purview of the FAA. Id.
30. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality
Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124-35 (2002) (discussing the
FAA's pro-efficiency remedial provisions).
31. See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (finding the FAA
preempted state notice requirements for arbitration clauses); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding the FAA preempted Alabama law limiting consumer arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding
that the FAA applies in federal and state court).
32. See Steven J. Ware, InterstateArbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 88-126 (2006)
(also proposing reforms aimed at solidifying the contractual approach).
33. See Dunham, supra note 27, at 330-40 (discussing the arbitration rules of the
AAA, ICC, and others).
34. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N ("AAA") COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2007), availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440;
AAA Supp. PROCEDURES FOR CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES (2005), available at http:l!
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014.
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split potentially high hearing costs, while AAA's Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes cap consumers' costs at dif35
ferent levels depending on the amount of their claims.

2. Applicable Contract Law
Contract defenses are the primary means for arbitration regulation in the wake of U.S. Supreme Court rulings rejecting arguments
36
that form arbitration clauses overly burden statutory rights.

Courts now enforce arbitration of statutory claims covering discrimi37
nation, consumer lending, consumer warranties, and securities.
This generally has included consumer protection claims under the
MMWA, even when arbitration clauses require consumers to pay pro38
cedure costs that could equal or exceed the amounts of their claims.
Furthermore, courts have agreed that arbitration of statutory claims
does not constitute state action subject to due process requirements
39
of the U.S. Constitution.
35.

Compare AAA

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES

R-49

to R-51 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440, with AAA SuPP.PROCEDURES FOR CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES C-8 (2005), available at http://www.
adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014.
36. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (finding
statutory age discrimination statute could be subject to arbitration); EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding
that Title VII did not preclude enforcement of an arbitration clause in an employment
contract); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-1110 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the clause at issue was not unconscionable because the employee could
opt out of the arbitration program).
37. See id. See also Randolph, 531 U.S. at 91 (finding Truth in Lending Act
("TILA") claims under a consumer financing agreement may be subject to binding
arbitration under the FAA); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (overruling prior opinion to hold securities claims arbitrable);
Schmitz, supra note 5, at 326-34 (discussing courts' general allowance for arbitration
of MMWA rights).
38. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1147-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing
arbitration clause although the ICC rules incorporated therein curtailed the Hills'
access to needed discovery and required them to pay roughly $4,000 in initial costs to
pursue their warranty claims on a $4,000 computer). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to follow Hill regarding enforcement of same clause). The Supreme Court has left open a small window for casespecific arguments that high filing costs may be invalid where they will prevent an
impoverished individual from vindicating her statutory rights. See Randolph, 531
U.S. at 91 (holding TILA claims arbitrable despite possibly high arbitration costs but
leaving open the possibility for such claims where one sufficiently proves inability to
cover the costs); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir.
2003) (finding cost challenges must be submitted to the arbitrator under the parties'
agreement).
39. See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding:The ConstitutionalImplications
of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1714-23, 1745-1762 (2006)
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Even if consumers successfully argue that an arbitration agreement's preclusion of rights such as class relief, recovery of punitive
damages, or recovery of attorney fees prevents them from asserting
their statutory rights, they often must still arbitrate their tort and
contract claims. 40 In addition, courts may informally push parties
toward arbitrating cases requiring potentially high administration
fees by signaling that they will enforce the arbitration clause if the
corporation agrees to pay arbitration filing fees. 4 1 Courts also may
order consumers to arbitrate warranty claims against some, but not
42
all, of the parties who may bear responsibility for the claims.
This leaves consumer challenges of arbitration clauses to contract defenses, such as lack of consideration, fraud, and unconscionability. 43 Furthermore, courts following the Supreme Court's
"separability" mandate will only consider these challenges when they
are aimed at the arbitration clause itself, and not the underlying contract as a whole. 4 4 At the same time, these arbitration clause challenges are often unsuccessful. Lack of consideration challenges, for
example, usually fail because it is sufficient if an arbitration provision is mutual, is among an exchange of various contract promises, or
45
is added pursuant to an initial contract allowing for additions.
(noting U.S. courts' conclusion that private arbitration does not involve state action,
but critiquing this conclusion with respect to arbitral class actions).
40. Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 828-33 (E.D. Va.
2002) (allowing litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of TILA and state
statutory and common law claims arising out of car sale).
41. See, e.g., Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840,
847-48 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding that an individual plaintiff could not be compelled to
arbitrate if required to bear the prohibitive arbitration costs but stating that the court
would reconsider its ruling if the defendants agreed to pay these costs).
42. Compare Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996) (enforcing arbitration against a consumer on behalf of non-signatory manufacturer based on broad
arbitration clause) with Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166, 1166-68 (Ala. 1996) (concluding there was no agreement to arbitrate between consumers and the non-signatory to
the arbitration agreement).
43. See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV.695, 695-97 (describing courts' enforcement of arbitration clauses generally).
44. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)
(finding courts may only consider attacks on an arbitration clause and not those
aimed at a underlying contract); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.
440, 443-49 (2006) (clarifying that this separability rule is a matter of federal law and
that an arbitrator must decide claims that the contract was illegal).
45. See Hawkins v. Aid Assoc. for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding initial contract terms allowing for later changes provided consideration for
later-added arbitration clause). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and
Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1382-86 (1996) (critiquing the courts' failure to require "meaningful consent").
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Fraud and misrepresentation claims similarly fail due to the heavy
burden of proving that the consumer accepted the arbitration clause
due to a knowing or recklessly-made false material representation
about arbitration. 46 In addition, assent challenges face high hurdles
because most courts agree that consumers are responsible for reading
their contracts and there is no duty to inform consumers explicitly
47
about arbitration provisions.
Some courts have nonetheless been more receptive to consumers'
48
challenges of arbitration agreements based on unconscionability.
Some have found pre-printed form provisions offered without negotiation unconscionable when they include suspect terms such as
"carve-outs" that give the drafter an option to litigate, cost and fee
allocations that overly burden one party, extremely inconvenient lo49
cation selections, and remedy limitations that gut statutory claims.
In one case, for example, the court struck a clause in an arbitration
provision in a consumer sales contract as unconscionable because it
gave the seller sole power to choose the arbitrator. 50 The court nonetheless affirmed the trial court's order to arbitrate with a court-appointed arbitrator. 5 1
In addition, some courts have refused to enforce class relief waivers embedded in consumer arbitration clauses. In Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp.,52 the Supreme Court of New Mexico refused to enforce
an arbitration clause in Dell's computer purchase contracts because
he class action ban was substantively unconscionable and against
state policy. 53 The court found that the consumers' small dollar
46. In re Firstmerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-58 (Tex. 2001) (in which consumers challenged arbitration based on fraud, along with unconscionability, duress,

and revocation).
47. See Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70 (D. Or.
2002) (emphasizing no duty to disclose or explain arm's length written agreements);
Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer PsychologicalRealities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 617, 61923 (2000) (discussing the court's strict enforcement of form contracts in precluding
fraud challenges of contracts containing disclaimer clauses).
48. See Stempel, supra note 7, at 812-13.
49.

See

CHRISTOPHER

R. DRAHOzAL,

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION:

CASES

AND

PROBLEMS 113-14 (2002) (listing suspect terms and citing cases supporting and denying these claims).
50. Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 825 So. 2d 779,
780-81 (Ala. 2002) (citing the provision and finding the transaction also was
adhesive).

51. Id. at 785.
52. Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008).
53. Id. at 1217-22.
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claims would not be worth pursuing in individual arbitration proceedings, and therefore the consumers needed to join their claims in a
class action to effectively vindicate their rights. 5 4 Quoting from another opinion, the court emphasized that without a class action, "only
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for [ten to twenty dollars.]" 5 5 The court
used this same reasoning to deny enforcement of the contract's choice
of law clause designating Texas law, which allows class action waivers; it held that the FAA did not preempt the court's application of
56
the unconscionability contract defense.
Such applications of unconscionability to arbitration clauses risk
FAA preemption if they frustrate enforcement of these clauses in contracts affecting interstate commerce. Furthermore, many courts apply the unconscionability doctrine in pro-arbitration and efficiencyfocused fashions and consequently reject unconscionability claims, as
well as other contract challenges of arbitration clauses. 57 The court
in Adler v. Dell, Inc., for instance, found the Dell arbitration clause
barring class relief enforceable under Texas and Michigan law. 58 The
court noted Dell's assertion that its arbitration provision promotes
affordable prices for its products and rejected the consumers' claims
that the costs of individual arbitration proceedings would effectively
54. Id. at 1218-22 (refusing to follow Texas law allowing for class action waivers
despite a Texas choice of law clause because of New Mexico's fundamental policy of
ensuring a viable mechanism for consumers to assert their rights).
55. Id. at 1220 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004) and adding language in brackets to the original quote). See also Genevieve
Saumier, Consumer Dispute Resolution: The Evolving CanadianLandscape, 1 CLASs
ACTION DEFENCE Q. 52 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291960 (noting
that U.S. states "continue to be thwarted in their attempts to protect consumers' access to courts and class actions" due to the FAA, whereas Canadian provinces have
been able to preserve such access through legislation denying effect of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts).
56. Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1222. This reasoning is somewhat suspect. The court admits that the contract was not adhesive and simply states substantive unconscionability as a conclusion after an exhaustive analysis based on "fundamental New Mexico
policy." Id. at 1221-22. Furthermore, the court used this policy to disregard the
Texas choice of law provision in the contracts. Id. at 1218-21.
57. See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002)
(denying an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration agreement); Johnnie's
Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 790 So. 2d 956, 963-65 (Ala. 2003) (enforcing a consumer's duty to
arbitrate warranty, fraud, breach, and other claims); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Lewis,
813 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 2001) (denying an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration
clause by an illiterate consumer).
58. Adler v. Dell, Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL 5351042, at *1-13 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 18, 2008) (noting that applying Texas law under the choice of law clause allowed
for enforcement of the class action waiver "[elven if Michigan could be said to have a
'fundamental interest' in prohibiting contractual class action waiver provisions").
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preclude their vindication of small claims.5 9 The court also emphasized that consumers bear the burden of reading and comparing sell-

ers' contract terms and should shop elsewhere if they do not want to
60
abide by Dell's arbitration provision.
Many courts have enforced consumer arbitration clauses assuming companies pass cost savings from arbitration programs on to con-

sumers through lower prices and higher quality. 6 1 Such assumptions
pervade opinions like Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., in which the court
enforced an arbitration provision in terms that came with a computer
consumers had purchased over the phone. 62 In finding that the consumers assented to arbitration by failing to return the computer
within thirty days, the Hill court fostered a judicial sentiment that
form contracts promote efficiency regardless of whether consumers
take the time to read or negotiate them.6 3 The court also failed to
find the arbitration provision unconscionable, even though the contract created potentially high proceeding costs and curtailed class ac64
tion relief on MMWA claims.
Consumers therefore face an uncertain and limited likelihood of

success in challenging arbitration clauses in the courts. Contract defenses remain the most viable means for challenging arbitration
clauses, but courts often apply these defenses in formalistic and efficiency-focused fashions to deny consumers' arbitration challenges.
Meanwhile, other courts apply defenses in uncertain or seemingly
59. Id. at *6-8 (also rejecting claims that NAF arbitration proceedings are inherently unfair toward consumers).
60. Id. at *9-10 (rejecting Adler's claims that it was unreasonable to expect him
to read and compare contracts). The court left open the possibility that a different
standard may apply to an "unsophisticated consumer" by distinguishing Adler based
on the fact he was an attorney. It also distinguished this case from others in which
the contract terms were not provided to consumers prior to completing purchases. Id.
61. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147-50 (finding customer assent to a form arbitration
clause). See also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435-51, 485-87 (2002) (explaining why electronic contracts are not adhesion contracts and discussing the efficiency
benefits of standard form contracts).
62. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147-50 (enforcing form computer purchase contract requiring arbitration under ICC rules). But see Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676
N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-76 (App. Div. 1998) (enforcing the identical Gateway arbitration
clause, but vacating the portion of the clause requiring arbitration before the ICC due
to the "excessive cost factor that is necessarily entailed in arbitrating before the
ICC').
63. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (stating that "approve-or-return" provisions such as
that in Hill make consumers better off "as a group").
64. Id. More uncertainty has been fueled by indication that antitrust claims of
collusively imposing arbitration clauses on consumers may have some viability. See
Ross v. Bank of America, N.A., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008).
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anti-arbitration ways that are vulnerable to FAA preemption challenges. The sum of litigation and unclear law breeds judicial inefficiency and consumer skepticism toward arbitration and highlights
some companies' onerous clauses. It also harms companies' ability to
rely on arbitration for cost savings that they may pass on through
lower prices and higher quality products and services.
B.

Theory and Policy Background

At the time of initial contracting, parties generally focus on key
terms such as price, timing, and performance standards. They usually pay little attention to arbitration or other dispute resolution provisions unless they are especially cognizant or concerned with
eventual problems or disputes. 6 5 Economic theory suggests that this
is usually efficient and cost-effective because it saves the contracting
parties from wasting resources wrangling over details of future sanc66
tions and dispute resolution proceedings they hope never to use.
Rational Design theory similarly posits that parties are more likely to
include arbitration or tailored dispute resolution procedures drawing
on external delegation in agreements involving complex or costly
67
issues.
At the same time, some economic theorists presuppose a rational
actor who has the opportunity to read and consider form contract
terms and conduct a cost/benefit analysis. 68 They therefore conclude
that courts should not hinder form contracts' efficiency by devoting
time or other resources to questioning whether the adhering parties
truly assented to form terms. 6 9 Formalist courts and commentators
65. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 55-56, 60-62 (1963) (finding in his early-1960s study of
business relations that parties usually focus on "description, contingencies, defective
performances and legal sanction").
66. See Tarek F. Abdalla, Litigation vs. Arbitration:Which Is Better for the Commercial Dispute?, PRAc. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2005, at 47, 51, 52 (discussing logic of basic
arbitration clauses). See also Macaulay, supra note 65, at 58-60 (explaining why standardized contracts without a lot of "red tape" are often cost-effective and practical in
business exchanges).
67. Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of InternationalAgreements Have Dispute
Resolution Provisions, Which HalfNeeds Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (2007)
(testing Rational Design theory in analyzing the frequency of dispute resolution provisions in international agreements).
68. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 233, 233-35, 255-56, 262-63 (2002) (emphasizing courts' failure to redress oppressive or unreasonable consumer contracts due to rigid adhesion to Professor Lef's two-prong procedural/substantive test).
69. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 761, 771-75 (2002) (critiquing this view); see also
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apply this theory and its tenets to form contracts by assuming consent and strictly enforcing form arbitration provisions without truly
70
considering contextual and relational factors.
Scholars have further used the law and economics model for predicting human responses to legal incentives based on this rational
choice theory and the assumption that people act out of economic selfinterest. 7 1 They posit that strict enforcement of form contracts fosters optimal economically efficient exchanges and hence wealth maximization. Thus, enforcement of form contracts results in cost
savings companies may pass on to consumers through lower prices,
lower interest rates, or higher quality, regardless of whether consumers actually read these contracts.7 2 As noted above, many courts
have adopted this same view in enforcing arbitration clauses regardless of whether parties have in fact read or considered the clauses at
73
the time of contracting.
Others acknowledge, however, that consumers rarely negotiate
boilerplate that they may not read or understand. 74 Cognitive and
behavioral theories consider more deeply individuals' strong likelihood to accept form terms, including arbitration clauses, without
question. 7 5 Scholars' research findings confirm individuals' "tunnel
vision," skewed by hindsight and outcome biases that assist digestion
Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward GreaterCertainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1387-90 (2001) (noting that courts generally
enforce forum-selection clauses and that cases protecting consumers from manufacturers' contractual specifications of applicable law "are the exception rather than the
rule"); Todd D. Rakoff, Contractsof Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1173, 1180-97 (1983) (also critiquing this view and its assumption of adequate
opportunity to read and consent).
70. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1147-50 (enforcing a form arbitration clause using an
efficiency rationale).
71. See Shinuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 122-23 (2007) (explaining rational choice assumptions
of consumer contracting as well as more nuanced implications of behavioral science);
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,StandardFrom Contracts,and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 1203, 1204-06, 1222-25, 1243-44 (2003) (discussing how buyers may not act fully rationally to the extent they do not expend the time and
resources necessary to maximize the accuracy or utility of their choices).
72. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements - with ParticularConsiderationof Class Actions and ArbitrationFees, 5 J. AM.
ARB. 251, 254-64, 292 (2006) (proposing that pre-dispute arbitration clauses benefit
companies and consumers).
73. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (noting formalistic and efficiency-focused application of contract defenses).
74. See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1240-43.
75. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,
1074-75 (2000) (explaining aim of behavioral law and economics); Becher, supra note
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of vast information, but lead to misperceptions and over-valuations of
that information. 7 6 In contracting, this may cause individuals to ignore or undervalue arbitration terms, especially when they do not un77
derstand the terms' significance or expect eventual conflicts.
Professor Korobkin has suggested that individuals' "bounded" rationality (human cognition is not perfect; we can be economically irrational) leads them to passively accept terms that operate without the
need for active bargaining, even if those terms are contrary to standard industry practice or legal defaults. 78 This is the result of not
only contractual "laziness," but also a fear of regretting action that
may breed undesirable results. 79 Consumers are therefore predisposed to accept arbitration and other form terms that sellers provide
80
on pre-printed forms that operate without action.
This propensity is augmented by individuals' fear of "rocking the
boat" or raising thorny issues of eventual disputes during contract
negotiations.8 1 Consumers may be especially reluctant to question
boilerplate arbitration clauses where consumers have an inferior position in the seller/consumer status hierarchy.8 2 Consumers know
that sellers control needed resources and therefore have the power to
offer these resources on the sellers' terms. This means consumers
71, at 123-25 (explaining behavioral law and economics basics). Traditional economics counters these arguments as difficult to test. See Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-75 (1998)
(critiquing behavioral law and economics as merely a psychological and sociological
account of human behavior that "confuse[s] explanation and prediction" and lacks
"theoretical ambition," and positing that it therefore cannot provide a useful model).
76. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 307-22 (discussing various cognitive
biases in the criminal context).
77. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 47, at 676-77 (summarizing cognitive and
social psychological factors hindering consumers from reading or understanding contracts, and noting that consumers enter into contracts assuming no problems will
arise).
78. Russell Korobkin, Inertiaand Preference in ContractNegotiation:The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1607-09, 1627
(1998) (advancing "inertia theory" based on his findings that parties have an even
stronger preference for default contract provisions than Coasean theorists might
expect).
79. Id. (explaining how negotiators may avoid potentially deal-breaking departures from status quo contract terms).
80. Id.
81. See Macaulay, supra note 65, at 60-64 (explaining how detailed negotiations
can turn "a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade" and how "detailed
negotiated contracts can get in the way of creating good exchange relationships between business units").
82. Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts:A Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY IN'L L. REV. 1, 29-33 (2002).
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generally accept arbitration terms even when they bar class relief or
other remedies consumers would otherwise want to retain under
83
common and statutory law.

Some scholars have used these contracting realities to critique
arbitration and other form provisions. They argue that sellers take
advantage of consumers' cognitive errors in dictating impenetrable
form terms.8 4 For example, in opposition to neoclassical economists'
arguments that such legislation is inefficient, Professors Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler have applied behavioral principles to explain why
consumer protection legislation is appropriate to quell significant departures from usual trade and fairness norms.8 5 They propose that
legislation is necessary to protect consumers from their failure to
guard their needs and long-term interests in the way neoclassical
86
economists assume due to bounded rationality.
Professor Becher similarly has advanced justification for consumer protections based on psychological and behavioral patterns he
identifies as sunk cost effect, cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias,
and low-ball technique. 8 7 He argues that companies take advantage
of individuals' propensities to ignore low-probability risks, to overestimate risks regarding recent incidents, and to "under-react to contractual risks" due to consumers' own self-serving overconfidence
about purchasing decisions.8 8 Becher highlights how psychologists'
"conflict model" for individuals' retreat from stressful situations indicates that consumers likely accept form contracts without reading or
negotiating them due to stressful contracting contexts such as high83. Korobkin, supra note 78, at 1627. This gives companies that draft form arbitration provisions considerable power in setting arbitration procedures, especially because consumers usually do not read or realize the significance of these procedures.
84. Becher, supra note 71, at 123-25.
85. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (providing an account of behavioral law and economics theory's foundations and analyzing it in positive, prescriptive, and normative terms, especially with respect to predatory lending laws).
86. Id. at 1476-81, 1546-47 (also expressing hope that economists and lawyers
would incorporate empirical findings into their assumptions, thereby rendering traditional economics obsolete). But see Posner, supra note 75, at 1559-75 (critiquing behavioral theories as "confus[ing] explanation and prediction," lacking "theoretical
ambition," and failing to provide a useful and applicable model); Gregory Mitchell,
Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral
Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72-74, 125-132 (2002) (critiquing the behavioral law and economics view as based on only limited empirical
research and as failing to precisely apply data to account for variation among decision-makers).
87. Becher, supra note 71, at 124-36 (explaining these various patterns).
88. Id. at 136-50.
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pressure sales tactics and time limitations.8 9 Moreover, the signaling
power of signatures and information overload effects suggest that
consumers are unlikely to give proper weight to electronic contracts
("e-contracts") loaded with form terms.9 0
At the same time, relational contract theorists have highlighted
the importance of parties' connections and relationships in assessing
the fairness and legitimacy of standardized pre-dispute arbitration
provisions, particularly within close-knit exchange communities. 9 1
Some have discussed the importance of communal culture in accepting and using private dispute resolution procedures.9 2 I have
therefore proposed that such broad and textured relational factors
may impact parties' differing needs, expectations, and understandings regarding dispute resolution.9 3 These differences may justify arbitration regulations in certain uneven bargaining contexts but may
amount to costly protectionism in other, more communal, contexts.
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses have become a norm in some consumer transactions, and they are generally enforceable. Furthermore, although many clauses contain onerous procedures that curtail
consumer remedies, generally there is no duty to give special notice
89. Id. at 151-64.
90. Id. at 160-78. See also Robert A. Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard Form
ContractingPractices:A Survey and Discussionof Legal Implications,in Is CONSUMER
PROTECTION AN ANACHRONISM IN THE INFORMATION

ECONOMY?

283 (Jane K. Winn ed.,

2006) (proposing requirements that electronic businesses make terms available on
their websites, allow for "cooling off" periods, and follow substantive mandatory rules
for forum selection and choice of law provisions).
91. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854
(1978) (analyzing the importance of the parties' relationships and reputation or goodwill incentives, and hence the "relational" nature, of long-term contracts); Macaulay,
supra note 65, at 55-56, 60-62; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: CreatingCooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,99 MICH. L.
REV. 1724 (2001) (exploring the cotton industry's reliance on intra-community rules
and norms, and thus its development and use of a private legal system ("PLS")).
92. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye
of the Beholder, 7 NEGOT. J. 249, 250-53 (1991) (highlighting the importance of cultural differences relating to ethnicity or nationality and recognizing similar differences due to race, gender, and age). Building on cognitive, behavioral, relational, and
cultural ideas, I have proposed a "contracting culture" continuum that acknowledges
the impacts of dispute resolution provisions in a particular communal context. Amy
J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123 (2007).
93. See Schmitz, supra note 92, at 123-72 (contrasting relational factors in commercial construction versus consumer contexts to the extent parties in these different
contexts do or do not share connections and understandings regarding industry norms
and applicable dispute resolution systems).
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or explain these clauses in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. 94
Neoclassical economic theories support strict enforcement of form
contracts, but behavioral and relational realities suggest that consumers do not fit the assumptions of economic rationality. This mixture of law, theory, and reality raises questions regarding the need
for, and design of, arbitration disclosure regulations. Regulations
may be warranted to protect consumers from onerous use of arbitration, but policymakers should design regulations in light of empirical
data regarding content, contracting, and perceptions of consumer arbitration provisions.
III.

THE LANDSCAPE OF EMPIRICAL CONTRACT AND
ARBITRATION RESEARCH

The empirical research on consumer contracting choices and behavior is generally limited, especially with respect to arbitration provisions. 95 Emerging contract behavior studies merely focus on the
"rationality" of consumers' choices based on monetary differences in
contracts, or correlation of contract terms with market share or assent mechanisms. 96 Meanwhile, arbitration-related studies usually
focus only on outcomes or reported satisfaction of those that have
participated in dispute resolution processes. 97 This has left a research gap regarding consumers' attitudes and behaviors with respect to arbitration clauses in form contracts. My mixed-method and
electronic survey research helps fill that gap.
94. See Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70 (D. Or.
2002) (finding no duty to disclose or explain arbitration clauses in arm's length contracts). But see Daly v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., No. 04-490, 2005 WL 590076,
at *1-2 (Mont. Mar. 15, 2005) (unpublished table decision) (finding broker had a fiduciary duty to his client to explain the impact of a pre-dispute arbitration clause in
their client/broker account agreement).
95. There are marketing studies and some academic studies that consider limited
situations, but these do not truly explore contracting with respect to dispute resolution clauses. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit
Contracts? (Nov. 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=843826 (reporting on a large U.S. bank's experiment comparing consumer credit
card choices with respect to no annual fee/higher interest rate versus annual fee/lower
interests rates when consumers do or do not carry balances).
96. Many commentators have been calling for more empirical studies exploring
consumer attitudes and behavior with respect to form contracts. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms
Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840-43 & n. 24 (2006) (also noting how most commentators merely cite or quote Todd Rakoffs non-empirical piece, Rakoff, supra note
69, at 1179, for the proposition that consumers do not read standard form contracts).
97. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors' Views of the Fairnessof Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp.
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BehavioralResearch

As noted above, some scholars have predicted that consumers are
98
unlikely to read and shop around for standard form contract terms.
In order to test this prediction, Professor Hillman surveyed 92 law
students regarding their contracting practices. 99 One may expect the
students surveyed to report contractual vigilance to their professor. 10 0 However, Professor Hillman found that beyond price and
product description, only 4% of the students reported that they read
their e-contracts for goods and services purchases "as a general matter," and 44% reported that they usually do not read terms beyond
price and product description. 1° 1 Seventeen percent reported that
they read some particular terms such as warranties, product information, disclosures, and warnings for purchases. 10 2 Respondents' reported reasons for failure to read e-contracts were being "in a hurry"
(65%), belief nothing will go wrong (42%), lack of diversity of others'
terms (42%), belief terms will be fair (32%), and belief law will cure
unfairness (26%).10 3 Only 7% indicated that they compare form
terms beyond price and product description despite the arguable ease
04
of "shopping around" via the Internet.1
Others have empirically studied the "rationality" of consumers'
credit practices. For example, Visa commissioned a survey of consumers about their credit card behavior.' 0 5 The survey findings suggested that consumers are not as economically "irrational" as
behavioral theorists have argued, to the extent that most consumers
RESOL. 349 (noting the limited research on arbitration and providing a report based
on the study of investors' perceptions).
98. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussing work of Korobkin
and others who have highlighted the unlikelihood that individuals will negotiate form
contracts). See also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 61, at 446-86.
99. Robert A. Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard Form ContractingPractices:
A Survey and Discussionof Legal Implications 25-30 (Cornell Law Sch. Research Paper No. 05-012, 2005), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=686817.
100. Id. at 4-5 (acknowledging that the study was limited by the size and make-up
of the sample).
101. Hillman also found through cross-tabulation that 36 of the 40 non-readers
encompassed in the 44% would not read under any circumstances, while four of them
may read depending on term, type of vendor, or value of the item purchased. Surprisingly, a larger percentage of the 92 respondents, 13%, reported that they do generally
read contracts for their e-subscriptions to such online services as those for database
searches, news, banking, dating, and phone. Id. at 7-9.
102. Id. at 8-12. Overall, roughly one-third stated that they would be more likely
to read e-contracts for higher value products or when the vendor is unknown. Id. at 8.
103. Id. at 9.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic:Maybe Not so Crazy, 73 U.
CHI. L. REv. 63, 63-77 (2006) (discussing the Payment System Panel Study ("PSPS")).
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do not pay annual fees on their credit cards and the majority of those
that do pay fees also carry revolving balances (presumably opting to
pay a fee to receive a lower interest rate). 10 6 In addition, the findings
did not support behavioral theorists' claims that consumers irrationally fall prey to "teaser" rates and high-interest cards that offer rewards. 10 7 Other research similarly has indicated that the majority of
consumers generally choose economically beneficial credit cards for
their borrowing practices.10 8
In contrast, some studies have shown that consumers sign up for
credit cards based on "teaser" introductory rates, but "irrationally"
fail to switch to lower-rate credit cards when teaser rates expire. 10 9
Research also has indicated that credit and banking markets have
not responded efficiently with respect to changing conditions - instead, interest rates are "sticky." 1 0° Interest rates also have fallen
during periods of rising bankruptcy filings, although economic models of consumer credit expect banks to tighten lending and thus increase rates during these times."' At the same time, evidence
suggests there is a high correlation between credit card debt and
12
bankruptcy filings.'
106. Id. at 77-83.
107. Id. at 81-83 & figures 2 & 3.
108. Agarwal et al., supra note 95 (studying consumers' selection between two
credit cards a U.S. bank offered to over 150,000 of its account holders). The study
examined holders' choices between one card with a higher interest rate and no annual
fee and the other with a fee but a lower rate. The researchers found that 60% selected
the economically optimal card for their borrowing practices, and that the avoidable
charges consumers bear due to their erroneous choices are fairly small (i.e., a roughly
$25 annual fee). The study also indicated that the likelihood of erroneous choice decreases as the magnitude of error costs increases, suggesting that consumers learn
from mistakes.
109. Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card
Market, 14TH ANNUAL UTAH WINTER FINANCE CONFERENCE (May 3, 2004), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622. See also David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do
Liquidity Constraintsand Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence
from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149, 180 (2002) (finding that consumers leave
money in low-rate checking accounts although they fail to pay off credit cards at far
higher rates).
110. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEx.
L. REV. 1481 (2006) (discussing such "sticky" interest rates and their interaction with
consumer behavior); Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the
Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 1327 (1995) (finding
sticky credit card interest rates during the 1980s and early 1990s).
111. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 110, at 1501-08.
112. Id. at 1521-24. See also Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit,and
Bankruptcy (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 44, 2006) (finding correlation through regression analysis, but failing to account for endogeneity problems),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=690701.
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This sampling of behavioral research provides mixed and uncertain evidence regarding consumers' propensity to read, negotiate, and
otherwise act in an economically rational manner with respect to
their contracts. 1 13 At the least, this evidence suggests that consumer
contracting is more complex than economic models predict. It also
raises questions regarding the efficacy of heightened disclosure regulations, and whether they have a meaningful impact on consumers'
awareness and consideration of non-price terms such as arbitration
clauses - especially when consumers may already be prone to ignore
fee and interest terms, which are tantamount to price.
B.

Contract Term Studies

Most of the other empirical studies of consumer contracts are
quantitative studies of gathered contract terms. For example, a
study of companies' appliance warranty terms in the early 1980s indicated no significant relationship between the terms' restrictiveness
and the companies' market concentrations. 1 14 Similarly, a more recent study of companies' End-User License Agreements ("EULAs") in
terms of their "pro-buyer" or "pro-seller" content with respect to 25
standard terms indicated that higher market share generally did not
lead to more pro-seller terms. 11 5 Overall, the author concluded that
competition impacts price and other "salient aspects of product quality but has weaker effect on less salient aspects, such as standard
116
terms."
This same EULA study nonetheless suggested that there is a
possible correlation between market power and arbitration
113. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 12, at 1-23 (draft paper reporting

results from a new study of consumer contracting behavior both supporting and refuting rational actor assumptions). Nonetheless, this research is limited by its sample's
small size, self-selection, and student demographic, and it does not test many salient
social and cognitive factors that may impact contracting. See id. The study is also
limited by its reliance on these students' reports of what they would do and not necessarily what they have done with respect to contracts. Id. at 23.
114. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1319-25 (1981) (comparing gathered warranty terms with respect to how re-

strictive their provisions were on consumer rights and remedies, and correlating restrictiveness with the drafters' market shares). These findings contravened what one
may predict based on monopoly theory. Id.
115. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts:The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPmICAL LEGAL STUD. 447
(2008) (creating seven categories of standard terms and using a system of adding/
subtracting points depending on her assessment of terms as more "pro-buyer" or "proseller" than the applicable U.C.C. Article 2 default rules).
116. Id. at 451.
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clauses. 1 17 Seventy-five percent of the EULAs studied had choice of
law clauses, 28% had choice of forum clauses, and only 6% had arbitration clauses. 118 In this small sample of EULAs with arbitration
clauses, most of the clauses also specified application of the drafters'
home state laws and administration by the AAA, 1 19 but they did not
appear to impose pro-seller regimes. 120 These findings are nonethe1
less limited to the extent the EULAs involve a narrow market. 12
Another study turned more broadly to consumer e-contracts of
Internet Retailer's 2005 top 500 companies, focusing on the assent
mechanisms these companies used for e-contracts. 122 The researchers reviewed the e-contracts and coded them according to an eightpoint continuum of assent level required, ranging from pure browsewrap, requiring no active indication of agreement, to robust clickwrap, accompanied by electronic documents users must actively accept before completing registration or purchase. 12 3 They then correlated assent levels with each company's market share and use of
"pro-seller" contract terms such as disclaimers, damage caps, and arbitration clauses.124 They found that barely 10% of the dataset required consent beyond pure browse-wrap, and that arbitration
117. See generally id. at 473-75 (concluding that her results cast doubt on assumptions that competition conditions significantly impact standard terms, but noting a
correlation between higher prices and lower competition). Professor Marotta-Wurgler
discussed the EULA study first with respect to form contract terms generally and
later with respect to dispute resolution clauses. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair"Dispute Resolution Clauses:Much Ado About Nothing? (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 08-08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093293 (explaining focus of this new trajectory of her analysis of EULAs).
118. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 117, at 10-16 (also finding that use of these different types of dispute resolution provisions was generally the same across business
and consumer sectors, and finding some evidence that larger and younger companies
were more likely to include choice of law clauses, possibly because larger companies
have more access to legal counsel in drafting their contracts).
119. Id. at 20-21 (noting that 25 of the 34 studied EULAs with arbitration clauses
selected the AAA, arguably recognizing the AAA's supplementary procedures for consumer disputes).
120. Id. at 22.
121. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate
Through PredisputeArbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 64 (2004) (finding arbitration provisions in 35% of studied
consumer contracts).
122. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting 1-3, 20-24 (Univ. of Tex. Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
104, 2007), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/clbe/papers.
html.
123. Id. at 14-17.
124. Id. at 16-25 & n. 51 (also categorizing choice of law/forum, statute of limitations, and jury/class action waivers as pro-seller, but essentially including these later
waivers with arbitration clauses).
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clauses appeared in less than a tenth of the contracts (44 of the 500
retailers). 12 5 They nonetheless found that companies used more robust mechanisms that required proactive consent with respect to proseller terms, suggesting that companies may design their websites to
12 6
ensure the enforceability of these terms.
Although at least one study has shown fairly consistent use of
arbitration clauses,127 a more recent study indicated that companies
do not prefer arbitration over litigation in all their dealings. Researchers looked at 26 consumer contracts and 164 non-consumer
contracts from 21 corporations in sectors including cellular phone,
cable, brokerage, and banking services and found that arbitration
clauses appeared in more than 75% of the companies' consumer contracts but fewer than 10% of the negotiated business agreements. 1 2
They also found that all the consumer arbitration clauses included
class proceeding waivers, and 60% voided the arbitration provision if
class proceedings were ordered.' 2 9 The researchers concluded that
these findings suggest that companies do not view arbitration as superior to litigation overall, but instead "value arbitration clauses for
their effects in suppressing aggregate proceedings by consumers, and
30
perhaps averting liability for widespread but low-value wrongs.'
Companies used arbitration clauses strategically to stymie consumer
access to remedies by preventing aggregate proceedings, which are
often consumers' only economically viable means for asserting small
3
claims.' '
125. Id. at 20-23 (noting surprise at these findings about arbitration, especially in
light of other evidence that arbitration clauses are now standard in credit card
contracts).
126. Id. at 36-38 (adding that it is still surprising how many companies include
pro-seller terms in their contracts without enforceable assent interfaces).
127. See Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at 877-81 (describing
other research and reporting their pre-study hypothesis that companies who advocate
arbitration in their consumer contracts would similarly use arbitration in their other
contracts).
128. See Eisenberg et al., MandatoryArbitration,supra note 15, at 118-23 (finding
arbitration clauses in 92.9% of employment contracts and 76.9% of consumer contracts, but only 6.1% of non-consumer business contracts); Eisenberg et al., Summer
Soldiers,supra note 15 (examining arbitration clauses in contracts of companies in or
nearly in Fortune magazine's top 100 companies).
129. Class litigation waivers and non-severability provisions voiding arbitration if
class arbitration is awarded were significantly more prevalent in consumer than in
non-consumer business contracts. Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15,
at 884-86.
130. Eisenberg et al., MandatoryArbitration, supra note 15, at 120-23.
131. Id. at 121-23 (also concluding that the "study suggests that the asserted benefits of arbitration - fair outcomes arrived at faster and at lower cost - are not the
dominant motives for inclusion of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts in the
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Still, there is some evidence of companies' beneficial use of arbitration clauses in their business-to-business dealings, especially in
international contexts. A study of international agreements among
businesses indicated higher use of provisions requiring arbitration or
32
other external dispute resolution procedures in complex contracts.1
This suggests that companies rationally use these clauses to temper
the costs and risks of litigation in accordance with Coasean economic
theory and to assist resolution of textured contract and cooperation
problems. 13 3 These companies are therefore more prone to invest resources in arbitration and private dispute resolution provisions when
involved in complex exchanges.
These studies of contract terms provide some insight into companies' use of arbitration, but they are limited and inconclusive. The
EULA study targeted licenses, while the assent mechanism study indicated companies fear unenforceability of their pro-seller terms such
as arbitration. Furthermore, the study most on point in assessing
frequency of arbitration clauses in companies' consumer versus other
contracts suggested that companies strategically use arbitration and
class action waivers to quell consumers' claims.
C. Arbitration Outcomes and Satisfaction
There have been limited studies of arbitration outcomes and of
disputants' perceptions of their satisfaction and experiences with arbitral dispute resolution processes. The outcome studies generally
look at the "win" rates consumers or employees enjoy in arbitration,
defining "win" in various ways. Some also compare award amounts
parties obtain through arbitration versus litigation, but these studies
often fail to consider settlements or adjust for summary judgments
and dismissals. In addition, the satisfaction studies are arguably
clouded by hindsight biases because they usually focus only on participants' perceptions of arbitration after their cases have been
resolved.
Outcome studies have provided mixed evidence that "weaker"
parties such as consumers and employees fare better in arbitration
industries we studied"). See also Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at
882-83, 894-95 (finding 90% of the employment contracts had arbitration clauses and
highlighting how companies would presumably include arbitration clauses in all their
contracts if they found it superior to litigation).
132. Koremenos, supra note 67, at 189-210 (gathering over 50,000 contracts registered with the United Nations and breaking this down to a random sample of 88
agreements for analysis).
133. Id. For further discussion of Coasean theory generally, see R.H. COASE, The
Nature of the Firm, in THE FiRm, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 33 (1988).
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than litigation.1 3 4 One study indicated that employees won 73% of
AAA employment arbitrations in 1992, and employees won significantly more cases in arbitration than litigation from 1993 to 1995.135
However, the AAA reported that in the 310 consumer arbitrations it
administered from January through August 2007, consumers prevailed in 48% of the cases they filed as claimants, while businesses
prevailed in 74% of the cases they filed. 13 6 It also reported that 41%
of all arbitrated cases were resolved on the documents only and produced awards in approximately four months (versus six months for
in-person hearings). 13 7 Nonetheless, an AAA representative reported
that consumers enjoyed "favorable" outcomes overall in 81% of the
cases they filed in 2006 if one takes into account settlements and
138
monetary awards.
134. See generally Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at 871-74 &
nn. 6-8.
135. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 45-50 (1998) (discussing studies of employment arbitration outcomes).
136. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Analysis of the American Arbitration Association's
Consumer Arbitration Caseload, http://www.adr.orglsi.asp?id=5027 (last visited Feb.
6, 2010) (noting that although the AAA administers roughly 1,500 consumer cases
each year, it limited its analysis to the 310 arbitrated cases that resulted in awards).
137. Id. The AAA also states that it applies its SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR
CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES when it administers what qualify as "consumer" cases,
defined as those "between individual consumers and businesses where the business
has a standardized, systematic application of arbitration clauses with customers and
where the terms and conditions of the purchase of standardized, consumable goods or
services" are primarily "non-negotiable." Id. This excludes residential construction
cases, which accounted for 937 cases in 2005 and 1,119 in 2006. E-mail from Jennifer
Jester Coffman, Senior Vice President of the Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Amy J.
Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (June 6, 2007) (on file with author).
138. See E-mail from Wayne Kessler, Vice President, Corporate Communications,
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch.
(Jan. 14, 2008) (on file with author). The AAA had previously indicated that it administered 1,294 consumer arbitration cases in 2006. See E-mail from Jennifer Jester
Coffman, Senior Vice President of the Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (June 6, 2007) (on file with author). The AAA
also indicated that in 2005 it received 1,652 consumer disputes including claims related to banking, lending, credit cards, mortgages, education, home construction,
wireless phones, real estate, car sales, warranties, accounting, and financial advice.
See E-mail from Jennifer Jester Coffman, Senior Vice President of the Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Mar. 16,
2007) (on file with author). Sixty-eight percent of these disputes involved claims of
less than $75,000. Id.; see also Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Consumer Arbitration Statistics, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29470 (last visited Jan. 27, 2010); ERNST & YOUNG
LLP, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING CASES
(2004), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudies
AndStatistics/2005ErstAndYoung.pdf (reporting that in the lending-related NAF
consumer arbitrations Ernst & Young studied in the early 2000s, 55% were resolved
in the consumer's favor and a majority of the consumers surveyed were satisfied with
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Some researchers have focused on securities arbitration due, in
part, to its impact on consumer investors who generally have no
choice but to have their securities claims resolved by NASD or NYSE
pursuant to industry forms and norms. 13 9 Fairness concerns have
fueled this attention in light of findings indicating a steady decline in
investor-claimant win rates in securities arbitrations from 1999 to
2004, and overall "win" recoveries of roughly 50% of amounts
claimed.140 For example, researchers studied securities arbitrators'
awards in light of their backgrounds and political ideologies. They
found that arbitrators who also represent brokers award less compensation to investor-claimants than other arbitrators. 14 '
Nonetheless, a study of survey responses from 3,087 participants
in securities arbitrations regarding their satisfaction with the process
indicated that customer respondents generally had positive views of
the arbitrators' competence and attentiveness. 14 2 However, customers reported less satisfaction with outcomes, arbitrators' impartiality,
CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004), availableat http://www.

the arbitration process);

mediate.com/cdricdri-printAug_6.pdf (providing findings regarding use of arbitration and outcomes).
139. Stephen J. Choi et al., Attorneys as Arbitrators (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-18; Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 09-001,
2009), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086372 (survey of 422 randomly selected
arbitrators and their 6,724 awards from mostly NASD securities proceedings from
1992 to 2006).
140. Id. at 12 (discussing a prior study by Edward S. O'Neil and Donald R. Solin
done without NASD support). Note that this arbitration is quasi-public to the extent
it is subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight. Id.
141. Id. at 15-16, 21-23, 36-37 (noting that this supported their arguments that
the 1998 securities arbitration reforms have advantaged repeat-players and that the
2004 reforms did little to counteract conflict of interest concerns). The study also
linked arbitrators' political leanings with their awards. Id. at 21-37. This is not
unique to arbitrators. See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A PreliminaryInvestigation, 90 VA.
L. REV. 301 (2004) (finding Democratic or Republican political leanings do have some
impact on judges' decisions, especially in affirmative action, sexual discrimination/
harassment, Title VII, and certain business cases).
142. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors' Views of the Fairnessof SecuritiesArbitration 7-9, 35-37 (Univ.
of Cincinnati Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
09-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118430 [hereinafter Gross &
Black #1118430] (noting academic support for the importance of perceptions in explaining why their study asked participants about their perceptions about arbitrators'
competence, impartiality, and awards); Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, Perceptionsof
Fairnessof Securities Arbitration:An Empirical Study (Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090969 [hereinafter Gross & Black #1090969] (assessing participants' perceptions of the fairness of securities arbitration, competence
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and the overall fairness of the arbitration process. 14 3 Over 75% of
customer respondents answered "very unfair" or "somewhat unfair"
when asked "[how fair is securities arbitration as compared to
court," and only 35.6% of these respondents said they would choose
arbitration over litigation in the future.14 4 In addition, customers reported that they lacked knowledge about the securities arbitration
process, presence of "industry arbitrators" on the panels, and generally how the arbitrators perform or make decisions.14 5 The researchers concluded that these findings overall indicated that the customers
do not view arbitration as fair and economical for all parties involved. 146 These perceptions are nonetheless tempered by evidence
that investors generally fare better in arbitration than in
14
litigation. 7
Another survey focused on pre- and post-process perceptions and
satisfaction with respect to dispute resolution; it highlighted the need
for dispute resolution education. 148 The survey findings indicated
that the disputants' initial perceptions of dispute resolution processes
did not impact what processes they ultimately used. The researchers
surmised that this was likely due to parties' reliance on their lawyers
of securities arbitrators, and fairness of arbitration outcomes - all in comparison to
litigation).
143. Gross & Black #1090969, supra note 142, at 37-39, 41-45 (discussing the findings based on Likert scale questions). Sixty-three percent of the customers they surveyed disagreed with the statement that "as a whole, I feel the arbitration process
was fair." Id. at 45.
144. Id. at 46-48.
145. Gross & Black #1118430, supra note 97, at 40-41 (noting the percentages of
customers who reported they "did not know" to many questions about the arbitration
processes in which they participated).
146. Gross & Black #1090969, supra note 142, at 52-53. This led Gross and Black
to conclude that it is critical for policymakers to design securities reforms aimed at
tempering perceived bias of industry arbitrators and lack of transparency in securities arbitration processes. Id. at 51-59.
147. Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairnessin Securities Arbitration,76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 496-99, 517-20 (2008) (addressing the propriety of the Supreme Court's endorsement of securities arbitration in McMahon
premised on assumed SEC fairness regulation, and explaining why securities arbitration is the better alternative for investors).
148. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute
Resolution Procedures:A LongitudinalEmpiricalStudy 1-5, 21-26 (Univ. of Cal., Davis, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 130, 2008), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=1103585 (discussing a longitudinal field study involving 108 completed paper surveys of disputants with cases filed in late 2004 and early 2005, followed by
telephone surveys with 44 of these disputants concerning their cases; of these, 26
were settled, negotiated, dismissed, or dropped, nine went to trial, one went to mediation, and one went to arbitration).
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and lack of necessary knowledge or experience regarding dispute res14 9
olution processes to make their own informed assessments.
Overall, the available research about process satisfaction indicates a lack of consumer information and understanding about arbitration. Although the research is mixed, there is evidence that
companies do not necessarily use market power to impose onerous
arbitration clauses, and consumers often fare well in arbitration.
Nonetheless, other evidence indicates that some companies do use arbitration to consumers' disadvantage, and consumers generally have
negative perceptions and voice dissatisfaction with arbitration. Although some consumer negativity may be unwarranted, there is need
to rein in abusive practices and provide consumers with effective disclosures and better information about arbitration processes.
IV.

MULTI-PRONGED ARBITRATION CONTRACT RESEARCH

Contract term and arbitration satisfaction or outcome studies
have left research gaps regarding consumers' contracting behavior
and understanding of arbitration clauses. Some scholars have highlighted these gaps, inviting further qualitative study in the form of
interviews and surveys to provide a more complete understanding of
arbitration clauses. 150 My mixed-method research provides this type
of data. Accordingly, I will give a synopsis of my findings from gathering arbitration terms in consumer wireless phone service and credit
card contracts. I will then add findings regarding consumers' perceptions and understandings of arbitration clauses from the consumer
focus groups I held in Denver and my recent electronic survey of Colorado consumers.
A.

Gathered Arbitration Clauses

As noted above, other studies have shed light on companies' use
of arbitration clauses in EULAs, international contracts, and consumer versus commercial contracts. 1 5 ' My study focused on collection and analysis of arbitration clauses in wireless phone service and
149. Id. at 30-42 (concluding that courts could improve disputants' ex post satisfaction by subsidizing the neutral's fees for court-mandated ADR and giving disputants the option of pursuing trial).
150. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 122, at 40 (noting this with respect to
their findings suggesting a close relation between industry concentration and arbitration clauses). My study attempts to provide more of the qualitative picture of consumers' contracting with respect to arbitration clauses.
151. See supra Part III (discussing prior research).
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credit card contracts. Although this was fairly unscientific and involved small samples, the work adds to the research landscape by
focusing on common consumer contracts in industries that have been
targeted for corporate use of arbitration to curb consumers' access to
class action and statutory remedies. This research also builds on
findings that industry concentration may be closely related to use of
arbitration clauses. 152

1. Consumer Credit Card Contracts
My collection and analysis of arbitration clauses began with
credit card companies' form contracts due to reports that companies
use these clauses to consumers' disadvantage. 153 Such reports contributed to a law barring arbitration requirements in active duty military members' consumer credit contracts and have generated
support for legislative initiatives to bar arbitration clauses in consumer contracts more generally.' 5 4 Furthermore, credit card companies have been the target of growing numbers of consumer challenges
of arbitration clauses, including antitrust claims that banks have ille1 55
gally colluded to force consumers to accept arbitration clauses.
152. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 122, at 40 (noting correlation); Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 15, at 882-85, 890-92 (highlighting companies' disparate use of arbitration clauses in consumer versus non-consumer
contracts).
153. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by
Consumer FinancialServices Providers, 1591 PLJICoRP. 35, 49 (2007) (including Citibank, Chase, AMEX, Discover, Bank of America, Capital One, Washington Mutual,
MBNA, and GE Capital in list of arbitration users); PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS
WATCH, THE ARBITRATION

TRAP: How

CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS

(2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/print-release.cfm?ID=7545
(summarizing results of the consumer advocacy group's examination of the credit card
industry's use of arbitration); see also id. at 1 (concluding that "binding mandatory
arbitration is a rigged game in which justice is dealt from a deck stacked against
consumers"); Collected Wireless Phone and Credit Card Arbitration Provisions (chart
on file with author) (last updated Mar. 2008) [hereinafter Collected Arbitration Provisions] (finding such prevalent use).
154. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)) (making arbitration
clauses unlawful in consumer credit contracts with military service members); Arbitration Fairness Act ("AFA") of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed, but
not passed, bill barring enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer,
employment, and franchise contexts); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 &
H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (identical bill that has continually been proposed for
barring arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, and franchise contracts).
155. Westlaw Search Results for "arbitration w/20 "credit card" & da(aft 1/1/2007)"
in ALLCASES database retrieved 208 cases on March 10, 2009 (on file with author).
The same search on June 6, 2008, retrieved 136 cases, indicating that the cases keep
piling up (on file with author). See also Ross v. Bank of America, N.A., 524 F.3d 217,
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As an initial matter, it was notably difficult to obtain copies of
consumer credit contracts in order to analyze their inclusion of arbitration clauses. My research indicated that credit card companies
usually provide only basic interest rate and "special offer" or "bonus"
information on their websites and mailed offers. They rarely include
or make available their full form contract terms. Furthermore, they
generally will only allow a consumer to obtain a copy of the contract
after the consumer has become a customer, or at least has applied for
a card. 15 6 Nine of the largest credit card companies refused phone
requests for copies of their form credit card contracts prior to submitting a credit application, and none of the twenty companies I wrote to
with requests for advance copies of their contracts have sent the
57
copies.1
In the end, thirteen credit card contracts were gathered and up158
dated through requests from companies and independent research.
These were then charted in terms of existence and content of their
arbitration provisions, as well as information the contracts provided
223-26 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that consumers allege sufficient injury in fact to proceed with their antitrust claims against credit card companies for colluding in the use
of arbitration clauses).
156. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153. The collection and updating
since June 2007 has been difficult and inexact due to companies' refusals to provide
copies of their contracts beyond general rate and fee information. I gathered some of
the contracts using copies obtained from my own credit cards or from students and
friends, but most of the companies we contacted to obtain their terms have not provided copies despite phone calls, e-mails, and letters. See, e.g., Letters to Credit Card
Companies and Research Assistant Chronicles [hereinafter Letters], Letters from
Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Feb. 6, 2008) (showing
attempts to obtain contracts) (record of letters and research assistant log of calls to
credit card companies on file with author).
157. Letters, supra note 156. For example, a research assistant reported that he
called Chase to obtain a copy of their terms and conditions but the phone representative refused to send him a copy until he became a card holder, even after he explained
that he did not want to apply for a card until after he knew the terms. See E-mail
from Aaron Clippinger, Research Assistant, to Amy J. Schmitz, Assoc. Professor,
Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (May 31, 2008) (Chase representative nonetheless suggested
that the terms might be available to someone who has been pre-approved for a credit
card).
158. See id. For example, U.S. Bank and Chase AARP Visa representatives informed my research assistant that she could not obtain a Cardmember Agreement
until she applied and received a credit card from the respective companies. See Notes
from Dana Jozefczyk to Amy J. Schmitz, Boulder, Colo. (Feb. 2008) (chart on file with
author); see also Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 15, at 120 n.8
(noting how credit card companies will not provide their full consumer agreements
until after one has submitted personal information and been approved for a card and
describing a company representative's refusal to provide an advance copy of the company's contract on grounds it "did not furnish its contracts to 'just anyone'").
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regarding APRs and other fees. Of these thirteen credit card contracts, three did not include pre-dispute arbitration clauses and one
allowed the consumer to opt out of the arbitration clause within
thirty days of receiving the terms by sending written notice to the
company. 15 9 Two of the companies' credit applications provided a
brief statement that they required consumers to submit any disputes
to binding arbitration under terms contained in the complete Customer Agreement, which consumers may obtain only after becoming
160
credit card customers.
The seven contracts with full arbitration provisions varied in
length, specificity, and content regarding procedures and remedies.' 6 ' Four of the provisions complied with the Consumer Due Process Protocol noted above to the extent that they allowed consumers
to bring qualifying cases to small claims court, and five specified that
the arbitration take place in the consumers' home location.' 62 Six
provided for some degree of company advancement or payment of arbitration filing fees. 16 3 Examples included payment for all costs,
those over $2,500, or those over what the consumer would have paid
had the claims been filed in court.' 6 4 Nonetheless, all of the contracts' arbitration provisions expressly precluded class action or consolidated proceedings of any kind, in court or in arbitration. 65 This
confirms prior research indicating companies' use of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts to bar class relief and limit consumer
claims.166
159. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
160. Id. These contracts also stated that all terms may be changed at any time.
161. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153. Some arbitration provisions were very difficult to read in terms of length and small typeface, even for a law
professor.
162. Id.
163. Id. Some of these contracts nonetheless allowed for any fee advanced by the
company to be reallocated for payment by the consumer in the award. One contract
also specified that the consumer would pay for fees required in conjunction with any
consumer-requested appeal to a three-arbitrator panel. Id.
164. Id. In between the extremes, one provided that the company would pay any
costs over what the consumer would pay to file in court and the other required the
company to pay filing fees over $500 plus administrative and arbitrator fees for two
days of hearings. Id.
165. Id. Some of the contracts also specified that the arbitration provision becomes void if class arbitration is ordered despite the contracts' preclusion of such class
relief. Id.
166. It seems companies began expressly precluding class arbitration in the wake
of arbitration providers' allowance for such proceedings. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153. See also supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Professor Eisenberg et al.'s research comparing companies' use of consumer versus
non-consumer contracts).
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In addition, although the small sample size did not allow for
meaningful statistical analysis, the credit card contracts studied did
not indicate that the companies using arbitration clauses passed on
savings from these clauses through lower rates and fees. Instead, the
credit unions generally had the lowest rates regardless of whether
they required arbitration. In addition, the three credit card agreements with the highest interest rates at the time the clauses were
studied all were careful to preclude class action relief.167 It was telling on a broader level to see the often surprising additional fees the
companies charge for everything from copies to making payments by
telephone. 16s Although these rates and fees very well may relate to
other risk, cost, and market issues, they at least call into question
economists' arguments that companies pass on arbitration-related
1 69
cost savings to their customers.
2.

Wireless Phone Companies' Consumer Contracts

In tandem with the above research, I gathered wireless phone
service contracts from the nine major providers with a presence in
Colorado. All of the companies required arbitration of consumer
claims. They did this as a blanket mandate or by giving either party
the right to require arbitration of any dispute that arises. Again, this
was a limited sample. However, their blanket use of arbitration
clauses supports procedural unconscionability claims that consumers
generally have no true choice when it comes to arbitration of wireless
service claims.
The wireless service companies studied did not appear to impose
more onerous arbitration provisions on consumers in exchange for
better rates, features, coverage, support, and phone selection. Although the small sample was not statistically analyzed, the wireless
service rankings done by Consumer Reports and other independent
organizations gave top ratings to two of the companies with the most
Protocol-compliant arbitration clauses among those studied to the extent that they required the companies to pay all or most filing fees
70
and allowed consumers to use small claims court remedies.
167. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
168. Id. (e.g., one company charges $25 for a dishonored check, $6 for copies, and
$15 for a phone payment).
169. Compare Ware, supra note 72, at 254-64, 292 (proposing benefits of arbitration clauses) with Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
170. See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153; TopTenREVIEWS, Inc.,
2010 Cell Phone Providers Review Comparisons, http://cell-phone-providers-review.
toptenreviews.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) (placing Verizon and AT&T at the top
per cost, plan, features, coverage, phone selection, and support).
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In addition, regardless of company rankings, all nine of the companies' contracts reviewed included explicit waivers of class or consolidated proceedings in either court or arbitration.' 7 1 Five of the
contracts went further to expressly void the arbitration requirements
if class proceedings were ordered. 1 72 This confirmed others' research
finding the prevalence in consumer contracts of class action waivers
and non-severability provisions voiding arbitration clauses if class arbitration is ordered.1 73 It also raised concerns regarding companies'
strategic use of these clauses to effectively avoid liability for largescale but small-dollar consumer claims, even if that means choosing
litigation over arbitration out of fear that arbitrators will order class
arbitration using their discretion or provider rules. 174 Although companies aim to avoid class actions in any venue, it seems they prefer to
at least have judicial constraints on any class proceedings they cannot avoid.
The arbitration provisions reviewed also exemplified how
merchants slide questionable provisions into arbitration clauses that
may not pass judicial muster if outside of the FAA's pro-enforcement
glaze.' 75 All of the class waivers appeared in generally lengthy arbitration or dispute resolution clauses. Furthermore, most of the
clauses contained confusing terms that could negatively impact consumers' claims. For example, one of the lengthy arbitration requirements precluded claims after two years from when they arose and
further stated:
171. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153.
172. One typical contract accessible on the Internet stated among its lengthy
terms in white typeface on a black background, "(6) We each agree not to pursue arbitration on a classwide basis. We each agree that any arbitration will be solely between you and us (not brought on behalf of or together with another individual's
claim). If for any reason any court or arbitrator holds that this restriction is unconscionable or unenforceable, then our agreement to arbitrate doesn't apply and the
dispute must be brought in court." In addition, the contract included another clause
in all capital letters precluding class relief of any kind in court or arbitration under
any circumstances. Boostmobile, Terms and Conditions of Service, http'//support.
boostmobile.com/servicepolicies/terms.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
173. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (discussing research finding
use of class waivers in consumer, but not other commercial, contracts of top
companies).
174. See, e.g., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14,
2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010); AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (effective Oct. 8, 2003),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?ID=21936 (allowing for class arbitration proceedings if an agreement allows class arbitrations or is silent on the issue).
175. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing research finding
use of arbitration clauses to bolster enforcement of otherwise questionable limitations
on consumers' access to remedies).
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Notwithstanding the foregoing [the company] has the right to
institute legal or equitable proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction for claims or disputes regarding: (i) amounts
owed by you in connection with your purchase of Service, or (ii)
176
your violation of the provisions of this Agreement.
This not only preserves the companies' access to court, but also appears to free the company from the two-year time limitation imposed
177
on consumers.
Overall, most of the arbitration terms reviewed in the credit card
and wireless service contracts were buried in long form contracts, and
often appeared in unnoticeable or small typeface.1 7 8 The terms also
were slipped in "bill stuffers" or included in e-contracts accessible
only through website links or "pop-ups" that consumers could easily
bypass or overlook.' 79 However, a few of the arbitration clauses were
in bold or all capital letters and directed consumers to arbitration
providers' websites for further information regarding administration
of any proceedings. 8 0
3.

Lessons Learned

This limited review of contract terms is not particularly scientific
and is by no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, it adds to the research
picture with respect to consumer markets in which companies generally have great power and consumers have little choice but to accept
176. MetroPCS, Terms and Conditions of Service, http://www.metropcs.com/
privacy/terms.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
177. Of course, a court may interpret this differently or sever it from the arbitration clause using a contract defense. Nonetheless, this provision seems particularly
onerous due to the breadth of the concluding carve out.

178. For example, the Boost Mobile arbitration provisions referenced above, accessible on the company's website, filled two pages toward the end of the Terms and
Conditions in white typeface on a black background and specified that consumers accept these terms and conditions simply by accessing the web site. See Boostmobile,

Terms and Conditions of Service, supra note 172.
179. This coincides with others' research of companies' consumer e-contracting
practices. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 122, at 20-24 (finding fewer than

10% of the 500 Internet retailers' e-contracts studied required assent to e-contract
terms beyond pure browse-wrap).

180. See Alltel Wireless, Terms and Conditions, http://tinyurl.com/yjpkyy2 (last
visited February 21, 2010) (relatively simple clause under "ARBITRATION"). The
clause required the company to pay administrative costs exceeding those the consumer would pay in court. Still, the brief clause precluded class relief, required the

parties to bear their own costs of preparing their cases, and denied the arbitrator any
authority to modify any of the contract's terms, including the term's limitation of liability section. Id.
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contract terms as presented. 1' My review mostly confirmed claims
that companies use arbitration clauses to limit their vulnerability to
consumer claims, especially class actions.
The difficulty of obtaining credit card contracts and the overall
presentation of the contracts obtained contradicted research noted
above indicating companies' use of more robust assent mechanisms
with respect to arbitration clauses in their e-contracts.1' 2 Instead,
my research indicated that at least in the wireless service and credit
card contexts, powerful companies dictate consumer form terms,
knowing consumers generally cannot "shop around" for optimal contracts. This is especially true when consumers lack opportunity to
183
review, let alone negotiate, advance copies of companies' contracts.
Furthermore, consumers' eyes are likely to glaze over attempting to
read and decipher companies' terms even when consumers get the
84
opportunity to review advance copies.'
Nonetheless, not all companies require arbitration, and some
companies offer more consumer-friendly provisions to the extent they
comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol. A few of the contracts reviewed prescribed use of arbitration providers' consumer
rules, company payment of some level of arbitration costs, and consumer retention of small claims court access. The research therefore
highlighted the following consumer concerns: lack of notice and information about the arbitration process, lack of public information
and access to discovery, and lack of class relief to make small claims
feasible and ensure enforcement of statutory rights. Although regulations may be warranted in all these areas, this article focuses only
on regulatory design to address notice and disclosure concerns.

181. Indeed, consumers recently launched antitrust claims against the major
credit card companies for collusive use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses to quell consumers' access to remedies. Ross, 524 F.3d at 223-26 (consumers pursuing antitrust

claims against banks for colluding to impose arbitration clauses that harm
consumers).
182. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing research findings of
Mann and Siebeneicher).
183. This contradicts courts' rejections of procedural unconscionability claims
based on assumptions that consumers can shop for contract terms. See supra notes
57-60 and accompanying text (discussing cases enforcing class action waivers).
184. See Becher, supra note 71, at 161-78 (discussing how information overload

hinders consumers' comprehension of contract terms).
wording in all capital letters may dissuade reading.
PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 172 (2d ed.
made up of all capital letters are extremely difficult to

Even ostensibly conspicuous
See MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A
2006) (noting how "headings
read").
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Focus Group Research

Traditional legal research, especially in the area of contracts,
tends to disregard qualitative interview or focus group methods.
Qualitative and focus group research nonetheless sheds light on realities of law in action and reveals questions ripe for further exploration.18 5 Understandings and perceptions matter because they shape
individuals' realities and their trust in the market.1 8 6 Negative perceptions of arbitration impact efficiency by breeding costly challenges
of arbitration agreements and awards, even in cases where they may
not be warranted.1 8 7 My focus group research therefore adds qualitative and organic insight into consumer perceptions and seeks to provide an "in action" or "on the street" peek into consumers' views of
contracting and arbitration.
Consumers were randomly recruited to participate in focus group
discussions on contracting issues that were held in Denver over two
days in November 2006.188 Despite recruitment in print and online,
there were only three small group sessions comprised of mainly Caucasian women. Nonetheless, some men and non-Caucasians also
joined the discussions, and the participants as a whole were "typical"
in that they had very little arbitration experience. In addition, no
formal surveys were conducted, which helped foster comfortable
discussions.
Overall, these consumers reported that they felt demoralized and
helpless against companies' form contracts and arbitration
clauses.1 8 9 They were pessimistic about companies' contracting practices and arbitration programs, and they generally distrusted
merchant sellers of goods and services. 190 Many reported instances
when they were stuck with extra charges or unpleasantly surprised
185. See Stewart Macaulay, A New Legal Realism: Elegant Models and the Messy
Law in Action, Presentation at University of Colorado Law School (Apr. 18, 2008) (on
file with author).

186. See id. at 6-7 (also discussing and citing work of Professors William Thomas
and Dorothy Thomas acknowledging this longstanding truism).
187.

See Gross & Black #1118430, supra note 97, at 7-9 (highlighting why subjec-

tive perceptions of arbitration matter regardless of whether they reflect factual
reality).
188. See Amy J. Schmitz, Notes, Consumer Focus Group, in Denver, Colo. (Nov.

18, 2006) (unpublished notes, on file with author). Schmitz recruited consumers by
offering $25 to participate in the discussions and placing announcements in newspa-

pers and on Craigslist and other such online sources. The research was done with the
approval of the University of Colorado Human Research Council (HRC) after completion of the application and training processes.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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with consequences of form contract terms they believed companies
imposed through indecipherable fine print or post-contract
changes. 191
Consumers in the discussions also reported that they regularly
throw out "bill stuffers" with terms companies add to consumer contracts, and they often bypass "terms and conditions" links in e-contracts they enter into over the Internet. 19 2 One consumer explained,
"I'm just scroll, scroll, scroll, accept."1 93 Consumers said they feel it
is a waste of time to read or retain any copies of form contracts because they have no choice but to accept them.19 4 One consumer recounted her "nerve-wracking" trip to the dentist in which she
unsuccessfully tried to contest terms given to her right before her
dental procedure, leaving her to simply hope that the dentist was
competent. 195
Some of the consumers nonetheless reported a sense of freedom
from their ability to "shop around" even if they cannot effectuate
changes in companies' form contracts. One consumer explained her
belief that "the nice thing about competition is that if you don't like
the contract you can just move on."1 96 However, she also believed
that competition did not give her leverage to negotiate changes in
form contracts "just because they're done like in a corporate setting
97
and they trickle down to the actual retail stores."'
Consumers indicated that they have little to no understanding
regarding arbitration. They generally said that they merely assumed
arbitration clauses must be something companies slip into their contracts to consumers' disadvantage.19 8 When asked about noticing arbitration clauses, one consumer relayed her feeling that such clauses
are likely in the "same stuff' she "usually just scan[s] through" but
"know[s] she should probably read." 199 Another consumer had noticed arbitration clauses in form contracts and assumed that arbitration was "supposed to be unbiased" but really the arbitrator would be
191. See Amy J. Schmitz, Transcripts, Consumer Focus Group, in Denver, Colo.
(Nov. 17-18, 2006) (unpublished transcripts, on file with author). For example, one
consumer told a story about a magazine she unknowingly became liable for when
signing up for a credit card years earlier.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. See also Schmitz, Notes, supra note 188.
195. Schmitz, Transcripts, supra note 191 (further explaining that her uncle had
recommended the dentist to her, which helped her trust his competence).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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"on [the company's] side" and "act like they are listening and say the
compan[y is] right and move on down the road."20 0 Fellow group participants echoed beliefs that companies use such terms to "cover their
20 1
own butts."
These negative perceptions of arbitration also impacted consumers' reported preferences for court versus arbitration. When asked,
"What do you think about going to arbitration versus going to court?"
one consumer responded: "I think I'd prefer court, I know that seems
20 2
weird but, because to me I would feel like I have a better chance."
The consumer explained: "It goes back to the thing where I don't necessarily think that the arbitrator would be unbiased. Even though
they may say it, I don't know, I'm just not a very trusting person
sometimes <chuckles>." 20 3 The consumer nonetheless said she might
prefer arbitration if administered by the Better Business Bureau because "they are, not necessarily on my side, but at least 50% on my
20 4
side."
Another consumer who taught in an inner-city school opined that
students like hers who feel they can only settle disputes through violence evidence "the less powerful people in society and they don't wait
around for an arbitrator." 20 5 The consumer explained that even with
contract or purchase disputes, consumers feel: "Hey, I ain't gonna
win no matter what. It's just a matter of luck if I can get through this
transaction and not get screwed." 20 6 She concluded that this feeling
was typical since most consumers are "at middle and below."20 7
At the same time, consumers in the focus groups indicated that
they often prefer to discuss complaints and claims in person with a
manager or other company representative, rather than through letters or e-mails. They felt they would get a more satisfying resolution
through personal dealings. 20 8 However, consumers also reported
great difficulties even contacting company representatives by telephone or e-mail to negotiate terms or resolve complaints. 20 9 This was
2 10
especially true when purchasing goods or services via the Internet.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.

202. Id. (first asking if the arbitration clause precludes litigation and seeming upset that it would).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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They also recounted instances in which salespersons told them that
form terms were not subject to any alteration, or that the salesper2 11
sons lacked power to change company terms.
Again, this was fairly limited focus group research. The discussions nonetheless helped paint the consumer contracting picture with
respect to arbitration clauses and indicated a common lack of understanding regarding arbitration. The discussions also supported evidence of consumers' negative perceptions of form contracts and
companies' use of arbitration clauses, and indicated that consumers
expect arbitration to be biased even if they are unsure what it entails.
The research again highlights a need for consumer notice and
education regarding arbitration clauses. 2 12 It also raises questions
regarding companies' lack of connection with or accountability to consumers, which escalates the likelihood of conflict and the inefficiencies it breeds. This casts doubts on efficiency theorists' contentions
that consumers will use their power to regulate corporate conduct,
especially when consumers lack power to reach company representatives or are so disillusioned that they no longer try. Disillusionment
coupled with contracting inertia also stymies consumers' impetus to
rectify their past contracting mistakes. 2 13 Disclosure and education
regarding arbitration may help address these problems by empowering consumers to avoid or negotiate arbitration clauses, or to employ
them to their advantage to obtain remedies.
C.

Online Survey Background and Findings

The above research provided initial insights into consumer contracting, especially with respect to arbitration clauses. However, it
lacked the scope and depth that survey research can provide. I therefore developed a survey for administration over the Internet that was
unique from other surveys in that it did not focus on simply purchasing practices or preferences, or satisfaction with arbitration proceedings. It went beyond these questions to explore what I call
"contracting culture."2 1 4 The online or "e" survey explored attention,
211. Id. See also Schmitz, Notes, supra note 188.
212. Consumers' assumptions of arbitrator bias also seem to confirm repeat-player
bias, at least to the extent that it has become a reality to consumers regardless of
whether they have actual experience with arbitration or even understand what it entails. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (discussing repeat-player concerns and research regarding investors' perceptions of biased NASD arbitrators).
213. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text (discussing various theories
and assumptions including contracting inertia and assumptions that consumers rec-

tify contracting mistakes).
214.

See Schmitz, supra note 92, at 123-27 (introducing this concept and analysis).
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perceptions, understandings, and negotiation of form contracts with
respect to a broad spectrum of contract terms, including arbitration
clauses. This article focuses only on questions and response data
2 15
from the survey regarding arbitration clauses.
1.

Research Design and Implementation

After extensive research, editing, and testing, a roughly twentyminute survey consisting of four main sections was created, coded,
uploaded, and administered with the assistance of the Institute for
Behavioral Science ("IBS") at the University of Colorado. 2 16 It was
then sent over the Internet to a total of 1,100 participants on Survey
Sampling International's ("SSI") panel of Colorado consumers over 18
years of age, and it ultimately reaped a research sample of 306 completed surveys from Colorado residents ages 18-88.217 Roughly one2 18
third of the respondents were male and two-thirds were female.
215. Future reports and publications will discuss the broader data.
216. See Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Survey (Dec. 2007) (unpublished survey, on
file with author). Creation of the survey took some time with the planning and design
research, followed by editing and testing survey drafts in order to cure ambiguities
and errors and to uncover additional research queries and hypotheses. For example,
this involved several rounds of drafting surveys and administering them to students,
colleagues, and other volunteers to gather feedback and gauge ambiguities revealed
through inappropriate or inconsistent responses. I thank Michelle Walker for her invaluable assistance with this process.
217. Use of the SSI panel ensured confidentiality and full approval for conducting
the survey from the Human Research Council at the University of Colorado. In addition, the survey first was sent to 8,000 Colorado residents over 18 in SSI's research
panel between October 22 and 25, 2007, from which 8% responded. The responses
were then coded and correlated with the demographic information SSI had previously
gathered for the respondents through their assigned identifying numbers/codes. We
then dropped from our sample any responses that were not complete (i.e., the individual did not complete all pages of the survey), were completed in six minutes or less (an
unreasonably short time for this survey), skipped many or essential questions, "flatlined" responses (indicating lack of attention or accuracy), provided nonsensical answers, or otherwise "cheated" in some way. We also checked the sample for overall
demographic balance and found underrepresentation of younger men. Accordingly,
we sent out between November 8 and November 13 an additional 2,000 invitations to
males 18-49 (from which we received a response rate of 2.5%), 1,000 reminders to
previously invited males 18-29 (from which we received a response rate of 1.5%), and
1,000 invitations to males 50+ (from which we received a response rate of 14%). We
then again dropped apparent "cheaters" using the same methodology we used for the
first group of responses, and we sent out additional reminders to males 18-45 in order
to fill out a sample of 300 Colorado consumers that was fairly balanced with the Colorado census information we obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. The process of
gathering and checking responses took over a month and allowed us to arrive at what
we believe is a solid sample.
218. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216. Despite attempts to gather more
male responses, we learned that women are much more receptive to answering online surveys.
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About half of these respondents were married, 7.5% lived with domestic partners, and the remaining respondents were single, separated, or widowed. 2 19 Three quarters of the sample identified
themselves as Caucasian or white, 10% as African American or black,
Hispanic or Latino, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, or multiple races, and the remaining respondents did not identify a racial
category. 2 20 The respondents had varying levels of education, with
43% earning Bachelor's or post-graduate degrees, 44% some college
but no degree, and the rest having a high school diploma or less.
Forty-two percent reported full-time employment, 16% reported part221
time jobs, and the rest reported no employment outside the home.
2. Insights into Consumer Arbitration
Although the survey asked questions about consumers' contracting behaviors and perceptions in general, it also included specific inquiries regarding arbitration and dispute resolution.
Specifically, the survey asked consumers if they read dispute resolution or arbitration terms. It also included arbitration or dispute resolution terms among the list of terms in questions asking what, if any,
terms consumers have sought to negotiate or change. Furthermore,
the survey asked consumers to rank terms, including arbitration and
dispute resolution terms, on scales regarding perceived "fairness" and
"importance." The survey also asked consumers whether they have
22 2
noticed arbitration clauses in their contracts.
Roughly three-quarters of the survey respondents reported that
arbitration terms are "very" or "somewhat" important with respect to
their consumer purchases of personal or household products and services. 223 However, only 39.6% of these chose "very important," while
the percentages of respondents that chose "very important" were
much higher with respect to price (83.2%), warranties (77.9%), fees
and penalties (72%), credit payment (74.7%), returns (66.6%), and
219.

Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Demographic Information (see

infra Appendix A).
220. Id.
221. Many did not identify themselves with respect to occupation. Of the 82% of
those that reported income, roughly 30% were under $29,999, 30% $30,000-49,000,
19% $50,000-$74,999, 9.6% $75,000-$99,999, and 11.2% over $100,000. Id.
222. See Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section II, Question 7 (see
infra Appendix B).
223. The question asked: "Think generally about the times when you have looked
at contract terms at any point with respect to your purchases of products or services.
Were any of the terms important to you? Indicate how you generally view the importance of the following types of terms." Id. Respondents could indicate "very important," "somewhat important," "of minor importance," or "not important at all." Id.
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cancelling services (67.7%). Still, the percentage for arbitration
terms was not that far from that for disclaimers/waivers of liability
(48.4%) and was above that for freebies and incentives (27.1%).224
Survey respondents also were asked to "think broadly about how
fair (using [their] own sense of 'fairness') [they] view different contracts and purchase terms, regardless of whether [they] have relevant personal experiences." 2 2 5 The question then listed types of

contracts and allowed respondents to rank these contracts according
to the following: "completely fair," "usually fair," "neutral/not fair or
unfair," "usually unfair," or "completely unfair." 22 6 "Dispute or claim
settlement agreements" was among the types of contracts listed,
along with contracts ranging from gym memberships and standard
22 7
forms to apartment leases and contracts with friends.
When it came to dispute or settlement agreements, 32.7% replied
"completely" or "usually" fair, 44.6% were "neutral," and the remainder said "usually" or "completely" unfair. 228 Respondents replied
"usually" or "completely" fair at much higher rates regarding nearly
all of the other types of contracts, including warranties (62%), car
sales (57.4%), employment terms (68.5%), and company's standard
form contracts (57.9%). Only gym memberships generated more neg2 29
ative responses, with 31% reporting completely or usually unfair.
This indicated that consumers are quite skeptical of dispute settlement agreements, although these agreements may be viewed differently than simple arbitration clauses.
At the same time, consumers' reported perceptions are clouded
regarding arbitration to the extent that roughly half of the respondents also said that they had not "seen or noticed anything about 'arbitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms" when buying
224. Responses of men and women were roughly the same with respect to the importance of arbitration. See Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section II,
Question 7, By Gender (see infra Appendix C).
225. See Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section II, Question 8 (see
infra Appendix D).

226. Id.
227. Id. The other types of contracts were: health club or gym membership contracts, company's standard form contracts or purchase terms, employment contracts
and handbooks, loan contracts, apartment leases, car sales contracts, credit card
terms, Internet purchase terms, warranties, cellular phone service contracts, con-

tracts with friends, and contracts with family members.
228. Id.
229. Id. The percentages reporting usually or completely fair with respect to the
remaining contracts listed were as follows: loan contracts (52.5%), apartment leases
(51.3%), credit card terms (39.1%), Internet purchase terms (44.6%), cell phone contracts (37.2%), contracts with friends (40%), and contracts with family (41.2%).
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consumer goods or services. 2 30 In addition, only 11.4% reported that
they found arbitration or other private dispute resolution terms "important at some point with respect to a complaint or dispute."2 3 1
Nonetheless, consumers did not report that they found many terms
important with respect to later contract complaints. The only terms
many found important were warranties (56.9% said "yes"), returns
23 2
(50% said "yes"), and cancelling services (46.7% said "yes").

In addition, respondents indicated that they are not proactive in
negotiating or changing form contract terms with respect to consumer purchases: 71.3% of female and 53.4% of male respondents
reported that they "never" or "rarely" "try to negotiate or change such
form contracts or terms."2 33 In addition, only seven (4.4%) of those
that had ever successfully changed contracts reported changing arbitration terms. 23 4 Respondents who had negotiated nonetheless indicated that they had changed terms at much higher percentages with
respect to price (70.3%), warranties (25.9%), fees (38.6%), interest
rates for credit payment (29.1%), returns (25.3%), cancelling service
(20.3%), incentives (22.8%), and disclaimers/waivers of liability
(10.8%).235 However, these findings are again clouded by consumers'

lack of familiarity with or attention to arbitration generally. It is
therefore not surprising that they would not take time or resources to
negotiate arbitration terms.
Overall, this response data seems to comport with research findings discussed above indicating that consumers generally care more
230. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 7 (see infra
Appendices E and F). Specifically, 52.5% of the female respondents and 46.5% of the
male respondents responded "no" to the question of whether they "[hiad seen or noticed anything about 'arbitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms." Id.
231. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 6 (see infra
Appendix G). The question asked: "Now think generally about any complaints or
disputes you have had regarding consumer purchases of products or services. What,
if any, terms have you found to be important at some point with respect to a complaint or dispute? Check ALL that apply." This was followed by a list of terms, including those for price, warranties, fees and other penalties, returning items, cancelling
services, "freebies" or incentives, and "Other" - or "N/A; I have never had a claim or
dispute." Id.
232. With respect to the other terms, respondents answered "yes" to importance in
percentages as follows: price (19.9%), fees/penalties (37.3%), interest rate/credit payment (21.6%), freebies/incentives (8.8%), and disclaimers/waivers (17.6%). Id.
233. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 1, By Gender (see infra Appendix H).
234. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question lb (see infra Appendix I).
235. Id.
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about price- and quality-related contract terms than what they consider less salient provisions, such as those regarding arbitration and
"freebies" or incentives. 2 36 However, it is unclear whether consumers
truly understand the impact of arbitration provisions. Consumers
may be more attentive to arbitration terms if they know how these
terms may curtail their warranty and other remedy rights.
For example, the majority of respondents indicated through their
responses to a scenario question that they would like a salesperson to
explain arbitration terms to them in making a consumer purchase.
Specifically, respondents were asked to imagine they had chosen a
car they wished to purchase and were given a five-page contract to
sign to finalize the deal. They were then provided a list of purchase
terms and asked to "check all the terms that [they] would want the
salesperson to explain."23 7 The results were that 57.1% of female and
53.4% of male respondents (55.9% overall) checked that they would
want terms requiring that they "resolve claims through private
means such as 'arbitration' instead of 'bringing claims to court" explained to them. 238 This was a higher overall rate than that for in-

centives (48.7%) and general boilerplate (41.5%), and not far below
that for technical/legal words (60.1%). Nonetheless, respondents said
they desired explanation at higher percentages with respect to price
(72.5%), warranties (92.2%), fees/penalties (84%), interest rate for
payment (75.2%), returns (76.1%), and disclaimers

(75.2%).239

It is

not surprising that consumers who do not notice arbitration clauses
would be less interested in explanation of these clauses than the
terms that already pique their attention.
Of course, this research is limited in scope. However, it provides
2 40
a view into consumers' contracting regarding arbitration clauses.
The results indicate some negative perceptions of arbitration clauses,

236. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing others' findings
that consumers focus on price-related and other "salient" terms).
237. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 216, Section III, Question 3 (see infra
Appendices J and K).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. As with any survey research, it is subject to interpretation differences as well
as perception and other cognitive biases. People read and interpret questions differently, regardless of how "clear" or sanitized the questions are. Furthermore, people
have a natural propensity to believe that their views are the "normal" views even
when they are not. See Lawrence Solan et al., False Consensus Bias in ContractInterpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1278-1300 (2008) (explaining false consensus
bias and how it applies in contract interpretation contexts).
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coupled with lack of attention or understanding regarding arbitration. This creates a somewhat circular contracting dynamic. 24 1 Consumers do not pay attention to arbitration clauses, which leaves
companies free to skew arbitration provisions to their own advantage
without consumers even noticing. At the same time, consumers may
distrust arbitration clauses due in part to their lack of understanding
or experience with respect to arbitration. These negative assumptions then fuel a sense of helplessness that may perpetuate this cycle
by further dissuading consumers from reading or negotiating arbitration clauses. Conspicuous and informative arbitration disclosures
may help address this dynamic by making arbitration more accessible and helping consumers understand how they can confront or navigate arbitration terms.
V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEXTUAL AND
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Most legislative proposals for arbitration reform, such as the Arbitration Fairness Act ("AFA"), call for an all-out ban on pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in certain contexts. 24 2 These proposals may
be overbroad and misguided, however, because they rarely address
the salient contextual and empirical research regarding consumers'
contracting behavior and understanding of arbitration. 2 43 Furthermore, this research is vital for prescribing arbitration disclosures,
which this article focuses on as a fairly uncontroversial first step in
regulating arbitration. Disclosures will nonetheless have little value
unless they account for consumers' contracting behavior, awareness,
and understanding with respect to arbitration clauses.

241.

See supra notes 65-93 and accompanying text (discussing theories regarding

consumer contracting behavior).
242. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). See also
Note, Recent Developments - Access to Courts, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Proposals for Reform of Consumer-DefendantArbitration,122 HARv. L. REV. 1151, 1170-

81 (2009) [hereinafter Access to Courts] (discussing the Act and critiquing its blanket
approach).
243. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 31-32 (emphasizing how "[1legal intervention

should be based on robust evidence of consumer mistakes leading to substantial welfare costs" and that the evidence should be market-specific).
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Contextual Considerationsfor ArbitrationReforms

The recently reintroduced AFA is indicative of the legislative
proposals that broadly bar pre-dispute arbitration clauses in traditionally uneven bargaining contexts; the AFA targets the employment, consumer, franchise, and civil rights areas. 2 44 The AFA also
reverses the "separability" rule by requiring courts to consider all issues going to the arbitration clause and/or the contract as a whole. 245
Although the Act has died in committee in the past, it may have new
life with recent political changes in Congress and increasing stories of
2 46
arbitration abuse.
As in the past, the Act is proposed based on a rote list of "findings" that includes statements that "most" consumers have no choice
but to accept arbitration clauses in their purchases, arbitration undermines public law, and the process gives companies "near complete
freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules."24 7 The findings
also state that arbitration providers "are sometimes under great
pressure to devise systems that favor the corporate repeat players
who decide whether those companies will receive their lucrative business" and lament that courts uphold "egregiously unfair mandatory
arbitration clauses."2 48
Research does confirm that some companies have used pre-dispute arbitration clauses in non-negotiable form contracts to their unfair advantage. 24 9 My and others' studies have shown that in certain
244.
245.

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
Id. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text (briefly explaining this rule

and citing relevant authorities).
246. This bill has been proposed in the past but has had little success. See, e.g.,
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (primarily

sponsored by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) but never
passed); H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. (2005) (failed bill to amend the FAA to preclude arbitration of employment disputes unless the employee and employer agree to arbitrate
after the dispute arises); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005) (another bill lost in committee
to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment con-

tracts). However, Rep. Johnson recently reintroduced the bill in the House of Representatives with more than 35 co-sponsors. Rep. Johnson Seeks to Strengthen
Consumer, Employee Rights, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga
04johnson/2009 02_12_arbitration fairness-drops.html (noting optimism for pas-

sage of the bill due to momentum and 35 original cosponsors). Campaigns for its passage have begun. See, e.g., Pete Mackey, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 - Get
Behind It, Feb. 10, 2009, http://mobile.injuryboard.com/miscellaneous/the-arbitra
tion-fairness-act-of-2009-get-behind-it.aspx.
247. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating findings in Section 2).
248. Id.
249. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text (describing the limited research regarding companies' use of arbitration clauses).
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areas such as credit card and wireless service contracts, many companies often preclude class proceedings and effectively lead consumers
to forego legal rights or bear the high costs of individual arbitration
proceedings. 250 Furthermore, many courts uphold arbitration
clauses with suspect procedural terms under the pro-enforcement
gloss of the FAA. 2 51 As the AFA findings suggest, policymakers and
consumers have negative perceptions of form contracts and
arbitration.
It is nonetheless debatable whether the Act's findings and consumer negativity regarding arbitration are entirely warranted.
Many consumer arbitration agreements are reasonable and may benefit both companies and consumers. 25 2 In addition, there is evidence
that consumers often are more likely to get some recovery in arbitration over litigation and have been satisfied with arbitration proceedings overall. 2 53 It may be unwarranted to assume that the fairly
large pool of arbitrators competing for clients would risk looking incompetent and losing business by ignoring proper legal and equitable
rules.

2 54

Moreover, many arbitration providers promulgate consumerfriendly rules, and there is evidence that many companies voluntarily
comply with those rules or do so under the urgings of the AAA or
other arbitration providers. 25 5 The AAA reports that it will not administer arbitration proceedings in accordance with clauses requiring
250. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing studies comparing
companies' use of arbitration clauses in consumer versus non-consumer contracts); see
also In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 300-09 (2d. Cir. 2009) (holding
that a ban on class-wide arbitration in credit card agreements was unenforceable because it would effectively insulate American Express from antitrust liability by cutting off consumers' only meaningful access to recovery).
251. See supra notes 36-64 and accompanying text (describing courts' treatment of
arbitration clauses).
252. See supra Part IV.A (discussing fair arbitration terms in some of the contracts gathered).
253. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (discussing studies indicating
favorable results for consumers who arbitrate their claims).
254. See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Cyber Law: Norms, Property Rights, Contracting, Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Without the State, 1
J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 269, 287 (2005) (noting arbitrators' incentives for remaining neutral and properly applying relevant rules and norms in order to garner respect, generate business, and be successful); Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms,
Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 79, 105-106 (2000) ("The competition among arbitrators gives them different
incentives than public court judges, who generally do not compete to attract
litigation.").
255. John Flynn Rooney, Study Finds that Arbitration Process Yields Benefits,
Cm. DALy L. BuL., Mar. 13, 2009, at 1 (reporting a study finding that 98.2% of the
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consumers to pay all arbitration costs and fees. 25 6 At the same time,

post-dispute arbitration agreements are rare in consumer cases and
companies cannot rely on or pass along cost-savings based on hopes
consumers will agree to arbitrate after claims develop. 2 57 It therefore
would be imprudent to bar pre-dispute arbitration clauses in all consumer cases.
Some companies' problematic use of arbitration still provides
reason for consumers' and AFA supporters' negativity. Clear regulation may help clarify uncertain case law, which has failed to provide
sufficient guidance for companies drafting arbitration clauses and
consumers seeking to challenge those clauses. 258 Furthermore, technological complexities of e-contracting and their increasing inclusion
of arbitration clauses add to the uncertainty and resulting litigation. 25 9 At the same time, most arbitration policy discussions are
flawed to the extent that they ignore empirical research, and instead
hinge on interested parties' advocacy for their positions based on
solicited stories and testimonials. 260 For example, the "findings" in
the AFA appear to be based on little more than position statements
consumer arbitration clauses that came before the AAA during the study period complied with their consumer protocols or the AAA took appropriate corrective action).
256. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Review of Consumer Clauses, http://www.
adr.org/si.asp?id=4453 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (stating the AAA's refusal to administer arbitration proceedings pursuant to consumer clauses that do not comply
with their due process protocol).
257. Others have argued that the AFA approach of barring enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses in broad and ill-defined categories was both over- and
under-inclusive, and that it may be more beneficial to legislate procedural reforms.
See, e.g., Recent ProposedLegislation, Arbitration - Congress ConsidersBill to Invalidate Pre-DisputeArbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees, and Franchisees ArbitrationFairnessAct of 2007, § 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 HARv. L. REV. 2262,
2267-68 (2008) (critiquing the Act's broad scope and approach); Access to Courts,
supra note 242, at 1175-77 (explaining how banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements prevents cost-reducing effects of pre-dispute arbitration clauses and will decrease both companies' and consumers' abilities to vindicate their rights).
258. See Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42
Hous. L. REV. 975, 978-83 (2005) (noting how especially with respect to arbitration
clauses, courts have varied widely in their approaches and responses, resulting in
uncertainty and inefficiency).
259. Id. (highlighting how courts struggle with emerging acceptance and enforcement issues regarding e-contracts and lack resources to address underlying technological issues).
260. See id. at 1008-10 (explaining why consumer interest group leaders advocate
for flat prohibitions on arbitration clauses based on testimony of those that have suffered most, even when consumers as a whole may benefit from these clauses and
would be better served by a more balanced approach); Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 3132 (discussing need for context-specific research in designing regulations).
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and featured testimony by advocacy groups and arbitration commentators. 26 1 It is difficult to decipher what Congress even considers due
to the volume of press releases and advocacy statements added to the
Congressional Record. 26 2 It appears that any studies Congress may
have considered were limited, inconclusive, or fairly uninformative
with respect to how reforms should be designed to capture the most
26 3
"bang for the buck."
Reforms should aim to address the real problems with consumer
arbitration, as well as their likely impacts on company and court
costs. Federal and state judicial budgets are tight, and the AFA may
increase courts' loads. Courts may not have resources to handle additional consumer, employment, and franchise cases that would no
longer be arbitrated in the wake of the AFA's passage. Companies
facing significant shortfalls and possible bankruptcies also may not
have the wherewithal to shoulder increased dispute resolution costs.
Moreover, regardless of one's lack of sympathy for these companies,
policymakers must consider the impacts of company costs and cutbacks on their prices, quality of goods/services, employees, and
stockholders.
Arbitration regulations should therefore seek to promote procedural fairness through protections aimed to be most cost-effective.
This is a tall order: it is difficult to know what impact any regulations will have until after they have been tested. However, consideration of empirical research can aid policymakers in crafting
regulations that are at least more likely to serve fairness and efficiency interests than those based solely on theory and assumptions. 2 64 This research should include not only studies of gathered
contract terms and arbitration outcomes, but also studies of consumers' contracting awareness, understandings, and behaviors.

261. See, e.g., William B.L. Little, Fairnessis in the Eyes of the Beholder, 60 BAYL. REV. 73, 146-51 (2008) (discussing the 2007 Act's broad "findings," how the
Act's sweeping scope would impact securities arbitration, and the politics surrounding
its consideration); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong.
(2009) (incorporating identical findings).
262. See Little, supra note 261, at 146-51 (discussing the various statements and
press releases pro- and anti-arbitration forces added to the record).
263. Id. (noting the limited and possibly skewed studies presented to the Congressional subcommittee considering the Act regarding securities arbitration alone). See
also Gillette, supra note 258, at 1008-10 (noting how advocates sometimes skew their
reports to suit their positions).
264. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 31-32, 35-38 (highlighting the need for contextual research in regulating contracts).
LOR
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B. Arbitration Disclosures Tailored for Consumers' Contract
Behavior
Deep empirical evidence should be considered in crafting a wide
spectrum of arbitration reforms. This may include varied procedural
regulations such as those I have proposed in the past for requiring
companies to comply with the 1998 Consumer Due Process Protocol,
which calls for clear notice of arbitration clauses, provision of information regarding the arbitration process, preservation of consumers'
access to small claims court, limits on consumer costs, and convenient
hearing locations. 265 Nonetheless, this article focuses only on the design of arbitration disclosure regulations. This is because such disclosures are fairly inexpensive and enhance contractual assent
instead of curtailing freedom of contract. 26 6 Disclosures are also less
controversial than substantive limits: commentators and policymakers with different political and theoretical viewpoints generally sup2 67
port disclosures.
Consideration of contracting behavior research is fundamental in
crafting disclosure rules because those rules' impact is directly tied to
whether consumers will read, understand, and utilize any required
disclosures. In the mortgage context, for example, commentators
have argued that more behavioral research is necessary in prescribing disclosure reforms that account for consumers' contracting biases
and behaviors. 268 Disclosures are not worth their costs if they fail to
help consumers shop for goods and services. 26 9 Furthermore, policymakers must consider whether consumers' biases may cause them to
265. Nat'l Consumer Disputes Advisory Comm., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Consumer
Due Process Protocol, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
Again, procedural protections beyond disclosure may be warranted. However, full
discussion of such protections has been discussed elsewhere and is beyond the scope of
this paper. See, e.g., Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 661-86 (discussing
additional reforms and regulations for consumer arbitration); Schmitz, Deference,
supra note 9, at 37-57 (proposing procedural reforms in lieu of a wholesale ban on
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts).
266. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 838-39, 846-48 (discussing the low cost of disclosure and compliance with Llewellyn's assent theory underlying U.C.C. Article 2).
267. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 31-32, 35-38 (noting how economic and behavioral scholars generally support disclosures but disagree on the scope of such intervention in contracts).
268. Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation 612 (Apr. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.
comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1121199) (arguing for more consideration of consumers' psychology in crafting reforms).
269. Id. at 7-10.
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contract in economically "irrational" ways regardless of whether they
2 70
read the disclosures.
Similarly, mandatory notice provisions for arbitration clauses
will have little impact if consumers do not read or understand them.
This is a valid concern in light of the consumers' responses in my
study indicating a general lack of attention to, or experience with,
arbitration clauses. Nearly ninety percent of the respondents reported that they did not see arbitration terms as important although
these terms are often central in claims resolution.2 7 1 In addition, despite respondents' reported distrust of dispute settlement terms, very
few of the respondents indicated that they had negotiated or changed
27 2
contract terms pertaining to arbitration or dispute resolution.
Other research similarly suggests that most consumers do not
read their contracts in general, and even consumers who read salient
terms may be dissuaded from reading arbitration provisions. 27 3 Consumers' contracting inertia, irrational optimism regarding the likelihood of future claims, and feelings of powerlessness may prevent
them from questioning or negotiating arbitration clauses even if they
are well-disclosed. 27 4 Regulations may have little impact if companies can ostensibly comply with disclosure rules but use inexpensive
27 5
strategies to shroud the disclosures.
Poorly designed mandatory disclosures may therefore increase
companies' contracting costs without providing real consumer protection benefits. Companies faced with new regulations would likely incur costs engaging counsel to provide legal advice regarding the new
rules. They also may incur costs implementing revised contracts and
perhaps adjusting on-line and paper contract delivery to ensure compliance. In addition, although such regulations may claim to clarify
enforceability requirements for arbitration clauses, they may nonetheless backfire by fueling litigation regarding their interpretation
and application.
270. Id.
271.

See supra notes 216-41 and accompanying text (explaining results from my

survey).
272. See supra notes 188-211, 233-35 and accompanying text (discussing findings
from my empirical studies).

273. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (highlighting studies indicating
signaling power of contracts and the effects of information overload on consumers'
propensity to read and give proper weight to e-contracts loaded with form terms).
274. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (noting power issues in company/consumer relations).
275. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 842-44 (discussing why consumers do not read
contracts).
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That is not to say that policymakers should not prescribe arbitration disclosure rules. Carefully tailored regulations would be worth
their costs to address consumers' lack of attention and education regarding arbitration clauses and some companies' harsh use of arbitration to effectively evade consumer liability. It is not surprising
that consumers who lack knowledge, experience, and power with respect to arbitration do not read or seek to change arbitration
terms. 27 6 Most consumers in my study reported that they had not
noticed arbitration clauses in their contracts, although they are likely
subject to these clauses in their credit card and wireless service contracts. 27 7 Notice must therefore be coupled with information about
arbitration's impact in order to raise consumers' interest in arbitration clauses and awareness regarding the clauses' preclusion of class
actions. 2 78 The majority of respondents in my study who said they
would want a salesperson to explain arbitration terms in a car
purchase would likely be even higher if those respondents understood
2 79
the terms' impact on their rights.
At the same time, evidence that companies include arbitration
clauses and class relief waivers in their consumer contracts, but not
in their other business agreements, raises questions regarding claims
that companies simply use arbitration as a superior method for
resolving their disputes. 28 0 Instead, this evidence suggests that companies strategically use arbitration clauses to cut off class claims and
thereby limit or preclude consumer recovery. 28 1 This was an aspect
of arbitration clauses participants in my focus groups did not realize
28 2
but were eager to learn more about.

276. See supra notes 188-211, 233-35 and accompanying text (providing findings
from my study).
277. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing findings from my
e-survey regarding lack of notice regarding arbitration clauses and my analysis of
contracts in these consumer contexts).
278. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Eisenberg et al.'s research regarding arbitration clauses and class waivers in consumer contracts).

Courts also voice concerns with harsh use of class arbitration waivers. See In re Am.
Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 300-309 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to enforce a
ban on class-wide arbitration in credit card agreements).
279. See supra notes 217-241 and accompanying text (providing results of my esurvey); see also supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing focus group

discussions in which consumers were surprised and concerned regarding arbitration
clauses' impact on their rights to go to court).
280. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (exploring research indicating
companies' strategic use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts).

281. Id.
282. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing my focus group
research and respondents' surprise to learn that arbitration clauses curtail their
rights to go to court).
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What does all this mean for arbitration disclosures? First, companies that use arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts
should be required to plainly and conspicuously give notice of the provision and its impact on litigation and class proceedings. This must
be pursuant to clear disclosure rules that do not invite litigation regarding their meaning and enforcement. In addition, the rules
should require companies to follow the notice with information about
the required arbitration process in order to ease companies' onerous
use of arbitration and consumers' negativity toward the process. The
mandatory nature of the rules also should put an end to some companies' unwillingness to provide consumers with pre-purchase copies of
their contract terms and the practice of shrouding arbitration clauses
in bill stuffers and complicated website links. Accordingly, arbitration disclosure regulations should go beyond prescribing a "reasonableness" standard to specify that companies using arbitration clauses
must provide consumers with basic information about how the arbitration process works, its likely costs, how an arbitration clause may
curtail class action and jury rights, and whom to contact for filing
claims and gathering further information. 28 3 Nonetheless, the disclosures should not cause information overload. Consumers rationally
weigh the value of their time and choose not to read long or convo28 4
luted contracts.
Regulations should require conspicuous provision of this arbitration information in a concise and readable format. 28 5 Specifically, arbitration disclosures could be included in a simple grid similar to the
Truth in Lending Act's ("TILA") grid, or "Schumer Box," which lenders must include in their loan agreements to disclose applicable fee
and interest information. 28 6 A few companies already provide arbitration information in such a grid in their form contracts, and others
283.

With respect to credit contracts, some have advanced an objective reasonable-

ness standard for disclosures that would require lenders to meaningfully convey necessary information in light of typical consumers' psychological biases. See Bar-Gill,
supra note 17, at 32-44 (further discussing a proposal for a more considered approach
for crafting disclosure reforms calculated to have real impact). Vague "reasonableness" standards, however, often raise more questions than they answer. See Schmitz,
Warranty Woes, supra note 9, at 628-30 (discussing need for procedural disclosure
protections in MMWA consumer arbitration).
284. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 12, at 20-21 (discussing their findings supporting other evidence that consumers place great importance on contract
length in deciding whether to take time to read their contracts).
285. Id. at 20-21 (proposing that regulations should aim to shorten contracts).
286. See Bar-Gill, supra note 17, at 35-37 (discussing TILA disclosures and the
"Schumer Box"); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1604(b) (West 2008) (requiring the Federal Reserve to
promulgate model disclosure forms and clauses to facilitate mandatory disclosure in
common transactions); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 app. G-10 (2009) (providing model disclosure
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could cheaply incorporate a grid using a legislative model. 2 7 This
would be more noticeable and understandable than the typically long
and unreadable arbitration clauses most companies use. 288 It also

would be more readable than a paragraph of ostensibly conspicuous
28 9
disclosures in all bold or capital letters.
At the same time, these disclosures could be posted on a central
website to allow for easy comparison. This could dovetail with proposals for broader central disclosure of consumer contract terms and
be included on a website that consumers could access to compare
companies' terms for common products such as wireless phone service and credit cards. 290 Indeed, there are already Internet sites for
consumers to compare general aspects of companies' wireless service
options (i.e., plan minutes, area coverage, costs, phones, etc.). These
sites also could include companies' arbitration requirements, giving
consumers a better opportunity to "shop around" for these contract
29 1
terms.
Although consumers may not make purchasing decisions based
on comparison of arbitration terms per se, central disclosure may at
least foster transparency and education regarding the arbitration
process. Disclosure would enhance arbitration awareness by signaling its importance, which may prompt consumers to question and
forms and clauses for common consumer transactions); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(u) (West
2008) (defining required disclosures in credit context as the annual percentage rate,
method of determining the finance charge and amount of balance upon which the
charge will be imposed, amount of the finance charge, the amount to be financed, total
of payments, the number and amount of payments, and dates for repayment of indebtedness); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 app. G-10(A) (2009) (providing model forms for credit card
applications and solicitations).
287. For example, administrative regulations set out a sample form for the credit
or charge card disclosures issuers must provide under 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a on or with a
solicitation or an application to open a credit or charge card account. Model Forms
and Clauses, Applications and Solicitations Sample (Credit Cards), 12 C.F.R. pt. 226,
App. G-10(B) (2008) (form included a succinct and readable grid format for the disclosures of interest rates and fees). A similar model grid could be used in consumer
contracts for disclosing key information regarding the contracts' arbitration requirements. See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 153 (some contracts included
pertinent information in a chart or grid form).
288. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (describing the arbitration
clauses I encountered in my review of cell phone and credit card contracts).
289. See Laura Schocker, Why do CAPITAL LETTERS So Annoy Us?, BBC NEWS
MAG., Sept. 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/magazine/8234637.stm (discussing some studies indicating that block capitals may be difficult to read and may
be considered "shorthand for screaming" when used on-line).
290. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 846-54 (discussing the pros and cons of
mandatory website disclosure of boilerplate terms in companies' e-contracts).
291. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 12, at 20-21 (noting options for contract term disclosure on the Internet).
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perhaps join together to resist or change overly burdensome arbitration terms or choose to shop elsewhere. In addition, central disclosure may raise "red flags" for regulators and watchdog groups
regarding harsh arbitration terms and give sellers incentives to use
2 92
and publicize more consumer-friendly arbitration procedures.
This, in turn, may improve consumer trust in arbitration and form
contracts.
Concerns would remain that some companies would decide that
they would reap greater benefits from onerous contract terms than
from fostering goodwill through disclosure of reasonable terms. Furthermore, even if mandatory website disclosure provides companies
with incentives to avoid particularly harsh terms, it may not dissuade them from drafting contracts with possible anti-consumer impacts. 29 3 Courts also may view companies' compliance with
mandatory disclosure rules as reason to provide disclosed contracts
with a safe harbor from unconscionablility review. It would be difficult for a consumer to argue that a contract is procedurally unconscionable if the consumer has access to the terms through the
29 4
companies' or a central website.
Nonetheless, these possible drawbacks to disclosure and central
Internet posting are not insurmountable and do not outweigh their
potential benefits. Disclosure may foster companies' adoption of reasonable arbitration practices and terms in order to avoid consumer
challenges and the gaze of watchdog groups such as Consumers
Union that are already vigilant of arbitration clauses. 295 Companies
and their attorneys must keep apprised of acceptable arbitration

292. Id. (noting how reputation concerns may prompt contractual fairness). See
also Hillman, supra note 96, at 853-54 (noting how watchdog groups may give companies an incentive to contract fairly, but this incentive may be insufficient to prevent
companies from "drafting marginal terms that may not create significant reputational
concerns but would harm consumers just the same").
293. See Hillman, supra note 96, at 854-55.
294. See, e.g., Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, No. 2:07-CV-916 TC, 2008
WL 2465450, at *2-4, *6-7 (D. Utah June 16, 2008) (finding that an arbitration clause
in amended terms posted on a company's website after the customer clicked "I accept"
for the original e-contract was binding on the customer because the customer bore the
burden to monitor the company's website for any changes allowed under the original
contract).
295. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumers Union Backs ArbitrationReform Package
(Mar. 11, 2002), available at http://www.consumersunion.orgtfinance/reformwc302.
htm (discussing the widely-respected publisher of CONSUMER REPORTS' support for arbitration reforms to address problems with arbitration clauses that curb consumers'
access to remedies).
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terms, considering that courts compare companies' practices in assessing enforcement of arbitration. 2 96 In addition, disclosure through
a grid breaking down key elements of arbitration proceedings would
alert consumers to their importance and make it more difficult for
companies to draft marginal terms that may otherwise escape notice
through confusing language. Furthermore, although safe harbor effects of disclosure rules may squelch a few valid claims, this would
hinder unfounded arbitration challenges and ease the current uncer29 7
tainties and inefficiencies of these lawsuits.
Policymakers also could augment central posting with an approval system for companies' consumer arbitration clauses. 298 This
could be similar to contract approval systems adopted elsewhere. For
example, the Israeli Standard Contracts Law encourages sellers to
submit their form contract terms to an administrative tribunal for
approval. If terms are approved, they are then provided a safe harbor
from judicial invalidation. 2 99 This process encourages reasonable
form contracts, although it has received some criticism to the extent
its voluntary nature allows companies to choose anti-consumer contracting over pre-approval. 30 0 Nonetheless, an arbitration term approval system could be mandatory to ensure compliance, and use of
the Internet would keep administrative costs to a minimum.
296.

See, e.g., Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 554-57 (8th Cir. 2009) (care-

fully distinguishing an arbitration provision in a credit card agreement from other
cases in upholding the provision that included a thirty-day opt-out and small claims
carve-out); Harris v. DirectTV Group, Inc., No. 1 07-C-3650, 2008 WL 342973, at *1-3
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2008) (highlighting how the 2006 arbitration provision at issue provided clearer notice than the unenforceable 1999 provision in upholding the cable
company's arbitration clause); Legair v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 213 Fed. App'x 436,
439 (6th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing this case from other cases holding employment
arbitration agreements unconscionable because here, Circuit City's arbitration agreement included an opt-out provision and employees were provided with notice and information about arbitration).
297. See supra notes 36-64 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty and
inefficiency of the current case-by-case analysis).
298. See Gillette, supra note 258, at 983-88 (discussing and analyzing proposals
for an administrative disclosure and approval system for form contracts); Ty Tasker &
Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and Technology of
Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 79, 145-47 (2008) (suggesting need for
rules requiring clear notice of contract terms for e-contracts).
299. Gillette, supra note 258, at 983-88 (noting the Israeli and European Community examples of such processes).
300. Voluntary systems are less intrusive on contractual liberty, but they are
problematic to the extent that companies may find it more profitable to forego the
system and continue using harsh terms. See id. at 987-89, 1012-13 (highlighting
drawbacks of a voluntary approval system, problems of encouraging sellers to use the
process, and administrative capture concerns).
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These are only some ideas to consider. The key is to continually
digest the full panoply of research in designing disclosure reforms,
instead of focusing on political bravado and advocacy statements.
Disclosures should account for the extent consumers read and understand arbitration clauses, as well as consumers' contracting behaviors and biases. Policymakers can start by considering the current
empirical evidence and gathering further research to fill in the gaps.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Consumer advocates call for abolition of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses, while industry groups oppose any regulation of contractual
freedom. The problem is that policymakers on both sides of the debate stake their positions and design proposed reforms in the dark by
clinging to politically-motivated statements and limited studies supporting their views. They rarely consider a full range of behavioral
and empirical research necessary for crafting cost-effective regulations. Failure to consider this research is especially problematic with
respect to arbitration disclosures. Disclosures are meaningless if consumers do not read or understand them. This article highlights the
importance of deep behavioral and empirical research in designing
arbitration disclosure rules and considers how rules may be tailored
in light of others' and my own empirical studies to provide optimal
consumer protection benefits for the attendant costs.
Research confirms behavioral theorists' predictions that consumers generally do not read or negotiate their contracts, and even consumers who skim contracts for provisions they deem salient are
unlikely to read arbitration terms due to lack of understanding or
experience with arbitration. Arbitration disclosures will therefore
have little impact unless they are presented in a manner that signals
their importance and provides sufficient information regarding the
applicable arbitration process and its impact on consumer rights.
Disclosures also must be clear and concise, which could be accomplished using a grid format like the TILA's "Schumer Box." In addition, arbitration provisions could be centrally posted on the Internet
in order to foster awareness and comparison shopping, and to incentivize companies' use of consumer-friendly procedures. Nonetheless,
these are initial ideas: more empirical research and discussion are
necessary to further illuminate optimal regulatory design.
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APPENDiX

A:

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Cumulative
Valid

18-24 yrs
25-29 yrs
30-39 yrs
40-49 yrs
50-59 yrs
60-69 yrs
70 yrs or

old
old
old
old
old
old
over

Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

19
16
40
73
81
54
23
306

6.2
5.2
13.1
23.9
26.5
17.6
7.5
100.0

6.2
5.2
13.1
23.9
26.5
17.6
7.5
100.0

6.2
11.4
24.5
48.4
74.8
92.5
100.0

Annual Household Income

Less than $20,000
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$39,999
$40,000-$49,999
$50,000-$59,999
$60,000-$74,999
$75,000-$99,999
$100,000-$149,999
$150,000+
Total
Missing System
Total
Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

43
33
43
32
22
26
24
23
5
251
55
306

14.1
10.8
14.1
10.5
7.2
8.5
7.8
7.5
1.6
82.0
18.0
100.0

17.1
13.1
17.1
12.7
8.8
10.4
9.6
9.2
2.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
17.1
30.3
47.4
60.2
68.9
79.3
88.8
98.0
100.0

Marital Status
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid

Single, Never Married
Married
Separated/Divorced/Widowed
Domestic Partnership

Total

58
150
75
23
306

19.0
49.0
24.5
7.5
100.0

19.0
49.0
24.5
7.5
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
19.0
68.0
92.5
100.0

Employment Status

Valid

Total

Full-Time
Part-Time
Not Employed

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

129
49
128
306

42.2
16.0
41.8
100.0

42.2
16.0
41.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
42.2
58.2
100.0
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Education Level
Frequency
Valid

Some High School
High School Graduate
Some College
College Degree
Some Post-Graduate
Master's Degree
Ph.D./Law/Professional Degree

5
34
135
78
17
27
10
306

Total

Percent Valid Percent
1.6
11.1
44.1
25.5
5.6
8.8
3.3
100.0

1.6
11.1
44.1
25.5
5.6
8.8
3.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
1.6
12.7
56.9
82.4
87.9
96.7
100.0

Respondent Occupation
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid

Missing
Total

Executive/Upper Management
IT/MIS Professional
Doctor/Surgeon
Educator
Homemaker
Student
None of Above
Small Business Owner
Total
System

12
11
2
11
33
13
168
17
267
39
306

3.9
3.6
.7
3.6
10.8
4.2
54.9
5.6
87.3
12.7
100.0

4.5
4.1
.7
4.1
12.4
4.9
62.9
6.4
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
4.5
8.6
9.4
13.5
25.8
30.7
93.6
100.0

Racial/Ethnic Identification
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid

Total

Unspecified
Other
Hispanic
Multi: Hispanic/Other
Pacific Islander
Native American/
American Indian
Multi: Hispanic/Native
American/American Indian
Asian
Black
White
Multi: White/Other
Multi: White/Hispanic
Multi: White/Pacific
Islander/Hispanic
Multi: White/Native
American/American Indian
Multi: White/Native
American/American
Indian/Hispanic

Cumulative
Percent

45
6
6
2
2

14.7
2.0
2.0
.7
.7

14.7
2.0
2.0
.7
.7

14.7
16.7
18.6
19.3
19.9

2

.7

.7

20.6

1
3
2
228
1
4

.3
1.0
.7
74.5
.3
1.3

.3
1.0
.7
74.5
.3
1.3

20.9
21.9
22.5
97.1
97.4
98.7

1

.3

.3

99.0

2

.7

.7

99.7

1
306

.3
100.0

.3
100.0

100.0
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B:

SECTION

II,

QUESTION

7

Participants were asked to "[t]hink generally about the times
when you have looked at contract terms at any point with respect to
your purchases of products or services. Were any of the terms important to you?" Participant responses as to how important they viewed
the various contract terms are presented below.
Price

Valid

Missing
Total

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

252
50
1
303
3
306

82.4
16.3
.3
99.0
1.0
100.0

83.2
16.5
.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
83.2
99.7
100.0

Warranties

Valid

Missing
Total

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Not Important
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

236
61
5
1
303
3
306

77.1
19.9
1.6
.3
99.0
1.0
100.0

77.9
20.1
1.7
.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
77.9
98.0
99.7
100.0

Fees and Penalties

Valid

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

218
72
13
303
3
306

71.2
23.5
4.2
99.0
1.0
100.0

71.9
23.8
4.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
71.9
95.7
100.0

Interest Rate for Credit Payment

Valid

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Not Important
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

227
48
15
14
304
2
306

74.2
15.7
4.9
4.6
99.3
.7
100.0

74.7
15.8
4.9
4.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
74.7
90.5
95.4
100.0
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Terms for Return

Valid

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Not Important
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

201
85
13
3
302
4
306

65.7
27.8
4.2
1.0
98.7
1.3
100.0

66.6
28.1
4.3
1.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
66.6
94.7
99.0
100.0

Terms for Cancelling Services

Valid

Missing
Total

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Not Important
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

205
84
13
1
303
3
306

67.0
27.5
4.2
.3
99.0
1.0
100.0

67.7
27.7
4.3
.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
67.7
95.4
99.7
100.0

Freebies/Incentives

Valid

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Not Important
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

82
118
81
22
303
3
306

26.8
38.6
26.5
7.2
99.0
1.0
100.0

27.1
38.9
26.7
7.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
27.1
66.0
92.7
100.0

Must Arbitrate Claims

Valid

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Not Important
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

120
110
60
13
303
3
306

39.2
35.9
19.6
4.2
99.0
1.0
100.0

39.6
36.3
19.8
4.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
39.6
75.9
95.7
100.0
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Disclaimers/Liability Waivers

Cumulative
Valid

Missing
Total

Very Important
Somewhat Important
Minor Importance
Not Important
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

147
109
43
5
304
2
306

48.0
35.6
14.1
1.6
99.3
.7
100.0

48.4
35.9
14.1
1.6
100.0

48.4
84.2
98.4
100.0
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APPENDIX C: SECTION

II,

QUESTION

7, By

GENDER

Participants were asked to "[t]hink generally about the times
when you have looked at contract terms at any point with respect to
your purchases of products or services. Were any of the terms important to you?" Participant responses, broken down by gender, as to
how important they viewed arbitration terms are presented below.
Important Terms: Must Arbitrate Claims
Very
Somewhat
Minor
Not
Important Important Importance Important
Gender Male

Total

Count
% within Gender
% of Total
Female Count
% within Gender
% of Total
Count 120
% within Gender
% of Total

40
39.2%
13.2%
80
39.8%
26.4%
110
39.6%
39.6%

36
35.3%
11.9%
74
36.8%
24.4%
60
36.3%
36.3%

23
22.5%
7.6%
37
18.4%
12.2%
13
19.8%
19.8%

3
2.9%
1.0%
10
5.0%
3.3%
303
4.3%
4.3%

102
100.0%
33.7%
201
100.0%
66.3%
100.0%
100.0%

180
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D: SECTION II, QUESTION 8

Participants were asked to "think broadly about how fair (using
your own sense of fairness) you view different contracts and purchase
terms, regardless of whether you have relevant personal experiences.
Please indicate how fair you view the following terms." Participant
responses as to how fair they viewed the various contracts and terms
are presented below.
Gym Membership Contracts

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

12
80
118
74
13
297
9
306

3.9
26.1
38.6
24.2
4.2
97.1
2.9
100.0

4.0
26.9
39.7
24.9
4.4
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
4.0
31.0
70.7
95.6
100.0

Company Standard Form Contracts/Purchase Terms

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

8
164
102
20
3
297
9
306

2.6
53.6
33.3
6.5
1.0
97.1
2.9
100.0

2.7
55.2
34.3
6.7
1.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
2.7
57.9
92.3
99.0
100.0

Employment Contracts and Handbooks

Valid

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

34
170
73
14
7
298
8
306

11.1
55.6
23.9
4.6
2.3
97.4
2.6
100.0

11.4
57.0
24.5
4.7
2.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
11.4
68.5
93.0
97.7
100.0

Spring 20101

Legislating in the Light
Loan Contracts

Valid

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

24
132
86
46
9
297
9
306

7.8
43.1
28.1
15.0
2.9
97.1
2.9
100.0

8.1
44.4
29.0
15.5
3.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
8.1
52.5
81.5
97.0
100.0

Apartment Leases

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

19
134
94
41
10
298
8
306

6.2
43.8
30.7
13.4
3.3
97.4
2.6
100.0

6.4
45.0
31.5
13.8
3.4
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
6.4
51.3
82.9
96.6
100.0

Vehicle Sales Contracts

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

19
152
80
35
12
298
8
306

6.2
49.7
26.1
11.4
3.9
97.4
2.6
100.0

6.4
51.0
26.8
11.7
4.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
6.4
57.4
84.2
96.0
100.0

Credit Card Contracts or Terms

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

18
98
78
84
19
297
9
306

5.9
32.0
25.5
27.5
6.2
97.1
2.9
100.0

6.1
33.0
26.3
28.3
6.4
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
6.1
39.1
65.3
93.6
100.0

HarvardNegotiation Law Review

[Vol. 15:115

Internet Contract/Purchase Terms

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

12
120
139
19
6
296
10
306

3.9
39.2
45.4
6.2
2.0
96.7
3.3
100.0

4.1
40.5
47.0
6.4
2.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
4.1
44.6
91.6
98.0
100.0

Warranties

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

24
160
73
37
3
297
9
306

7.8
52.3
23.9
12.1
1.0
97.1
2.9
100.0

8.1
53.9
24.6
12.5
1.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
8.1
62.0
86.5
99.0
100.0

Cell Phone Contracts

Valid

Missing
Total

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

16
94
83
83
20
296
10
306

5.2
30.7
27.1
27.1
6.5
96.7
3.3
100.0

5.4
31.8
28.0
28.0
6.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
5.4
37.2
65.2
93.2
100.0

Contracts with Family

Valid

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

34
87
146
18
9
294
12
306

11.1
28.4
47.7
5.9
2.9
96.1
3.9
100.0

11.6
29.6
49.7
6.1
3.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
11.6
41.2
90.8
96.9
100.0
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Contracts With Friends

Valid

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency
26
92
151
15
11
295
11
306

Percent
8.5
30.1
49.3
4.9
3.6
96.4
3.6
100.0

Valid Percent
8.8
31.2
51.2
5.1
3.7
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
8.8
40.0
91.2
96.3
100.0

Dispute or Claim Settlement Agreement

Cumulative
Valid

Completely Fair
Usually Fair
Neutral
Usually Unfair
Completely Unfair
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

17
79
131
60
7
294
12
306

5.6
25.8
42.8
19.6
2.3
96.1
3.9
100.0

5.8
26.9
44.6
20.4
2.4
100.0

5.8
32.7
77.2
97.6
100.0
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7

Participants were asked if they "[h]ad seen or noticed anything
about 'arbitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms."
Ever Seen or Noticed Arbitration in Consumer Contracts or Terms
Cumulative
Valid

No
Yes
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

151
148
299
7
306

49.3
48.4
97.7
2.3
100.0

50.5
49.5
100.0

50.5
100.0
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APPENDIX F: SECTION III, QUESTION

7, By GENDER

Participants were asked if they "[hiad seen or noticed anything
about 'arbitration' in any consumer purchase contract or terms." Participant responses, broken down by gender, are included below.
Ever Seen or Noticed Arbitration in Consumer Contracts or Terms
Total
Yes
No
Gender

Male
Female

Total

Count
% within Gender
% of Total
Count
% within Gender
% of Total
Count
% within Gender
% of Total

47
46.5%
15.7%
104
52.5%
34.8%
151
50.5%
50.5%

54
53.5%
18.1%
94
47.5%
31.4%
148
49.5%
49.5%

101
100.0%
33.8%
198
100.0%
66.2%
299
100.0%
100.0%
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6

Participants were asked to "[t]hink generally about any complaints or disputes you have had regarding consumer purchases of
products or services. What, if any, terms have you found to be important at some point with respect to a complaint or dispute?" Participant responses are presented below.
Price

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

245
61
306

80.1
19.9
100.0

80.1
19.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
80.1
100.0

Warranties

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

132
174
306

43.1
56.9
100.0

43.1
56.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
43.1
100.0

Fees/Penalties

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

192
114
306

62.7
37.3
100.0

62.7
37.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
62.7
100.0

Interest Rate for Credit Payment

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

240
66
306

78.4
21.6
100.0

78.4
21.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
78.4
100.0

Returning Items

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency
153

Percent
50.0

Valid Percent
50.0

153
306

50.0
100.0

50.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
50.0
100.0
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GENDER

Participants were asked to "focus again on your consumer
purchases and the form contracts or purchase terms you encounter
when buying consumer products and services. Roughly, how often do

you try to negotiate or change such form contracts or terms when you
purchase consumer products or services?" Participant responses, bro-

ken down by gender, are listed below.
How Often Change Contracts or Terms
Never Rarely Sometimes
26
28
31
Gender Male
Count
30.7%
% within Gender 25.7% 27.7%
% of Total
8.6%
9.2%
10.2%
Female Count
89
55
34
16.8%
% within Gender 44.1% 27.2%
11.2%
% of Total
29.4% 18.2%
83
65
14
Total Count 115
% within Gender 38.0% 27.4%
21.5%
% of Total
38.0% 27.4%
21.5%

Half the
Nearly All
Time Frequently the Time Total
6
7
3
101
5.9%
6.9%
3.0% 100.0%
2.3%
1.0%
33.3%
2.0%
4
202
8
12
4.0%
5.9%
2.0% 100.0%
2.6%
4.0%
1.3%
66.7%
303
19
7
6.3%
2.3% 100.0%
4.6%
2.3% 100.0%
4.6%
6.3%
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APPENDIX I: SECTION

3,

QUESTION

1B

Participants were asked, "What types of terms have you been
able to get changed in form contracts?" Participant responses are
listed below.
Price

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

47
111
158

29.7
70.3
100.0

29.7
70.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
29.7
100.0

Warranties

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

117
41
158

74.1
25.9
100.0

74.1
25.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
74.1
100.0

Fees/Penalties

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

97
61
158

61.4
38.6
100.0

61.4
38.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
61.4
100.0

Interest Rate for Credit Payment

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

112
46
158

70.9
29.1
100.0

70.9
29.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
70.9
100.0

Terms for Returning

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

118
40
158

74.7
25.3
100.0

74.7
25.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
74.7
100.0

HarvardNegotiation Law Review
Terms for Cancelling Services

Arbitration Claims

Incentives

[Vol. 15:115

Legislating in the Light

Spring 2010]
APPENDIX

J:

SECTION

III,

QUESTION

3

Participants were asked to "[i]magine that you are shopping for a
car, and have found the one you think you want. The salesperson
gives you a 5 page contract with purchase terms, and asks you to sign
it in order to finalize the purchase. Please review the list of purchase
terms below, and check all the terms that you would want the salesperson to explain to you." Participant responses are listed below.
Explain Price

Cumulative
Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

84
222
306

27.5
72.5
100.0

27.5
72.5
100.0

27.5
100.0

Explain Fees/Penalties

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency
49

Percent
16.0

Valid Percent
16.0

257
306

84.0
100.0

84.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
16.0
100.0

Explain Interest Rate for Payment

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

76
230
306

24.8
75.2
100.0

24.8
75.2
100.0

Terms for Return

Cumulative
Percent
24.8
100.0
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Explain Arbitration Requirements

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

135
171
306

44.1
55.9
100.0

44.1
55.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
44.1
100.0

Explain Freebies/Incentives
Cumulative
Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

157
149
306

51.3
48.7
100.0

51.3
48.7
100.0

51.3
100.0

Explain Disclaimers/Liability Waivers

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

76
230
306

24.8
75.2
100.0

24.8
75.2
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
24.8
100.0

Explain Boilerplate

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

179
127
306

58.5
41.5
100.0

58.5
41.5
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
58.5
100.0

Explain Technical/Legal Words

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

122
184
306

39.9
60.1
100.0

39.9
60.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
39.9
100.0

Explain Other (Yes/No)

Valid

No
Yes
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

300
6
306

98.0
2.0
100.0

98.0
2.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
98.0
100.0
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K:

SECTION

III,

QUESTION

3, By

GENDER

Participants were asked to "[ilmagine that you are shopping for a
car, and have found the one you think you want. The salesperson
gives you a 5 page contract with purchase terms, and asks you to sign
it in order to finalize the purchase. Please review the list of purchase
terms below, and check all the terms that you would want the salesperson to explain to you." Participant responses to the arbitration
question, broken down by gender, are listed below.
Explain Arbitration Requirements
Gender

Male
Female

Total

Count

Count
% within Gender
% of Total
Count
% within Gender
% of Total
135
% within Gender
% of Total

No

Yes

Total

48
46.6%
15.7%
87
42.9%
28.4%
171
44.1%
44.1%

55
53.4%
18.0%
116
57.1%
37.9%
306
55.9%
55.9%

103
100.0%
33.7%
203
100.0%
66.3%
100.0%
100.0%

